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INTRODUCTION 
The regulation of business is, in all probability, as old as man 
himself. According to Koontz and Gable (61, p. 5), many economic func­
tions were regulated by the government in ancient Greece and there was a 
code of law governing economic relations which was developed under the 
Roman Empire. Early governments and even the early Catholic Church 
derived and applied many principles to business. 
The merchant guilds and the craft guilds of the Middle Âges repre­
sented a type of regulation. Merchant guilds were known in the ninth 
century, but their real rise in popularity dates from the eleventh century, 
and by 1300 it is reported that they could be found in practically every 
town in England and Western Europe (61, p. 6). About this same time the 
towns began performing a regulatory function and 
. . . between roughly 1400 and 1550, besides protecting guild 
monopolies, towns undertook the licensing of traders and the 
regulation of the time, place, buildings, and commodities of 
markets. (61, p. 6) 
During the same period, there was a gradual transition from feudalism to 
a nation-state system. In time it was the national government that 
formulated extensive regulations so as to encourage manufacture for export 
and in order to secure a more favorable balance of trade. 
Influence of Regulation on American Constitution 
Among the causes that led to the American Revolution was the mercan­
tilist policies of England (61). The American colonists were very 
dissatisfied with a number of the restrictions imposed upon them by the 
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mother country. They were forced to trade with England on English ships; 
I 
they were relegated to being primarily a source of raw materials, for 
England forbade the importing of machinery into the colonies; and the tax 
policies seemed designed only to enrich the English treasury. 
Because the drives for economic freedom and for political 
Independence were reactions against mercantilism and because 
both occurred at the same time, a prejudice against control 
over business by any government influenced the framers of 
the American Constitution and colored the character of early 
American business morality. (61, p. 8) 
Adam Smith and "Self Regulation" 
The same year that the American Colonies declared their independence, 
1776, Adam Smith published his Wealth of Nations. Adam Smith believed 
that there were forces working within the market which would make all 
business self-regulating. The market would therefore be its own guardian. 
This "self-regulation" was assured by allowing each individual to be 
guided in his business actions by his own self interests and passions. 
Rather than destroy the market, this freedom would result in competition 
within the market which in turn would bring about results "which would be 
most agreeable to the interest of the whole society" (49, p. 39). Under 
competition all market prices would tend to equal their natural price, 
that price which would properly compensate each of the factors of produc­
tion and assure continued production without providing an excess payment 
to any one factor. 
The natural price, therefore, is, as it were, the central 
price, to which the prices of all commodities are continu­
ally gravitating. Different accidents may sometimes keep 
them suspended a good deal above it, and sometimes force 
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them down even somewhat below It. But whatever may be the 
obstacles which hinder them from settling in this center of 
repose and continuance, they are constantly tending towards 
it. (105, p. 102) 
Public Utilities 
The world of Adam Smith has been referred to as one of 
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competition" (49). The market since that time has changed. 
market today is still influenced by competitive conditions, 
characterized by the huge size of some of its participants. 
. , . giant corporations and equally giant labor unions 
obviously do not behave as if they were individual proprietors 
and workers. Their very bulk enables them to stand out against 
the pressures of competition, to disregard price signals, and 
to consider what their self-interest shall be in the long run 
rather than in the immediate press of each day's buying and 
Sellings (49, p. 43) 
An additional influence upon the market mechanism has been the growth 
of governmental intervention, including the classification of certain 
industries as "natural monopolies" and as industries which are "affected 
with the public interest." 
Gas, electric, and telephone utilities 
Three industries conceived in the late 1800*s, were soon considered 
"natural monopolies". They are the gas, electric, and telephone industries. 
The first commercial gas company to distribute manufactured gas was 
established in Baltimore in 1816. Gas was used primarily for lighting 
streets and public buildings. The price of gas was very expensive, due in 
part to the fact that the industry was very competitive and many communi­
ties had more than one company supplying it gas service. This resulted in 
"atomistic 
Although the 
it is also 
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the volume of business being small and the overhead costs high (9> p. 26). 
The real development of the gas industry dates from the 1880's when 
the newly developed electric industry brought a new type of competition 
into the lighting field. The commercial exploitation of natural gas came 
after 1870, and its use was expanded after 1925 due to extension of the 
pipelines. 
The telephone industry had its beginning in 1875 with the first suc­
cessful experiment by Alexander Graham Bell, and in 1877, the Bell 
Telephone Company was organized in Massachusetts. 
The electric lighting industry traces its beginnings back to the 
successful development of the carbon-filament lamp by Edison in 1879. In 
1882 the "first central station distributing electric energy, constructed 
by Edison at Pearl Street in New York City, began operations." (9, p. 31) 
Each of these industries has exhibited phenomenal growth since their 
initial beginning. ' 
Characteristics of public utilities 
A number of conditions influenced the market structure within each of 
these industries resulting in their being identified as "public utilities". 
First, there was a special public importance or necessity for the type of 
service supplied by these enterprises. Second, these firms provided 
services to a severely localized and restricted market. Third, due to the 
large investments required in production and distribution facilities, 
there existed conditions of decreasing costs and economies of scale beyond 
those experienced in other businesses, and this emphasized the benefits of 
expanded production facilities and a need for increased sales. (19). 
Competition within these industries, therefore, became destructive 
and failed to yield desirable benefits to society. The results were more 
often poor service at a' high cost to the consumer while the competing 
companies received low profits or experienced losses. 
Development of monopolistic market structure 
The fight for survival in this competitive situation resulted in 
entrepreneurs adopting different tactics. Some companies achieved 
superiority within an area by pricing competition out of business. Other 
companies found it to their advantage to restrict competition by formal 
agreements regarding the division of the territory. At other times 
companies would merge their interests into one firm with control over the 
total territory. Some companies were able to negotiate exclusive 
franchises with a city or town thus providing some protection from competi 
tion. Whatever the action taken, the result was often a very profitable 
operation for the remaining firm due to its monopolistic position and 
monopolistic pricing policies. 
Regulation of Public Utilities 
Some local regulation resulted early in the history of these three 
industries due to their need to use the city streets and public places 
for the construction, maintenance, and operation of some of their facili­
ties (p, p. 218). Local governments, in granting a franchise to a company 
could require that certain procedures be followed. It was not unusual 
though for the local government to grant franchises to more than one 
company in an industry, believing that competition would be beneficial. 
Failure of competition 
The gas, electric and telephone industries failed to achieve, under 
competitive conditions, desirable social and economic results. While most 
people had a stroijig belief in the advantages of a competitive market 
structure and were distrustful of the monopolistic structure, the results 
within these industries did not speak well for competition. Local regula­
tion and later state and federal regulation was turned to as a substitute 
for competition. It was believed that regulation would enable these three 
industries to expand and utilize large scale operations, and thereby 
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benefit from the economies of scale. At the same time regulation would 
prevent destructive competition and provide the consumer with good service 
at a fair price while allowing the utility to earn a "fair return on their 
investment." 
It was basically after the turn of the century that the fallacy of 
depending upon competition to protect the consumer and the ineffectiveness 
of local regulation became obvious to the legislators of a number of the 
states. State commissions were soon created with regulatory powers. Prior 
to 1870, these commissions were primarily advisory in nature. From 1870 to 
1907 railroad commissions were often given the additional authorization to 
regulate the public utilities, and since 1907 this task of regulation has 
usually been assigned to a public service commission (9, p. 174). 
Many states initiated regulatory legislation and activities early in 
the 1900's. The federal government stepped up its regulatory activities 
over the interstate activities of these industries by passing the Communica­
tions Act of 1934, the Public Utilities Act of 1935, and the Natural Gas 
7 
Act of 1938. 
Regulation as a Substitute for Competition 
In a competitive situation, an entrepreneur has the incentive to 
manage his business as efficiently as possible. The price he charges, for 
the final product is supposedly determined in the competitive market and 
the more efficient his management, the higher his net profit. Any advan­
tage one merchant may have over another is considered relatively short 
lived, as other entrepreneurs will enter the more profitable industries or 
assume the more profitable methods of operation, thus eliminating any 
advantage one entrepreneur may temporarily have over another. To remain 
in business, one must make a profit and this usually implies a continuing 
flow of innovations to enable one to stay ahead of competition. The 
consumer is thus the beneficiary in improved products and services at 
I 
reasonable prices. 
Today's enterprise is under the control of a decision making unit 
known as "management." This control group is often separate from the 
owners, otherwise known as investors or stockholders. Even so, a basic 
I 
assumption in conventional price theory embodies an empirical generaliza­
tion concerning the motivation, or guiding principle of action, of managers, 
(enterprisers) in providing and selling their product. This assumption is 
that any buyer or seller will act to maximize his aggregate profits. 
Economists recognize that this assumption is an over simplification 
of reality, but the profit-maximization hypothesis seems to have 
represented fairly accurately the apparent ethics and behavior of 
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capitalism. Bain (4, p. 50) writes that 
. . . speaking of contemporary capitalism in a broad way, 
it still seems fair to say that the pursuit of monetary 
profit constitutes a main motivation or ordering principle 
of action for business enterprises generally, and that, 
subject to increasing limitations and restraints which 
actually modify the meaning of "maximizing a profit," 
profit maximization represents some sort of rough central 
tendency of endeavors. 
In pursuing profit maximization, management is motivated to organize 
the enterprise and produce its service as efficiently as possible. It is 
constantly concerned with new developments in technology as well as 
production and product inovations which will enable the enterprise to keep 
ahead of competition. 
There are many who believe regulation does not assure this type of 
management within Public Utilities, but, in fact, protects the inefficient 
and creates a tendency for all utilities to be no better than average. 
Bonbright (19) identifies the four functions of public utility rates 
. . . (1) the producer-motivation or capital-attraction 
function; (2) the efficiency-incentive function; (3) the 
demand-control or consumer-rationing function; and (4) the 
income-distribution function. 
Referring to the second function he states that 
. . . these incentive-encouragement features of orthodox rate 
regulation are extremely crude, and one may suspect that they 
are very ineffective in comparison with the stimulation of 
direct and active competition. (19, p. 49) 
Prof. Trebing recently wrote: 
Perhaps the most serious accusation to be leveled against the 
commission system in recent years is the charge that regulation 
stifles incentives for inovation and greater efficiency. 
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Prof. Bain (7, p. 595) in his text on Industrial Organization states 
that 
Existing public utility regulation is subject to a number of 
serious deficiencies as a means for securing the best in market 
performance from regulated industries, and cannot to date be 
considered an approximately ideal device of its type for 
furthering public welfare. 
The argument is thus presented that regulation does not act as a 
substitute for competition. Consequently, "management" does not have the 
same incentive to manage the enterprise efficiently as would normally be 
expected under competitive conditions. 
Corrective Measures Suggested 
If regulation then fails to motivate management, how can this situa­
tion be remedied? One solution would be for the regulatory process to 
recognize managerial efficiency and performance. This might be done in a 
number of different ways, but an increase in the rate of return for the 
efficiently managed utility is a common suggestion. Other suggestions 
include non-monetary and psychological approaches to the motivation of 
management. 
Bain, however (7, p. 630), suggests that . . . 
commissions charged with regulation of existing utilities 
should in general be given more power, so that instead of 
in large part simply limiting (or supporting) rates to 
cover average costs, they could in addition (under adequate 
legislative standards) control or establish the scale of 
operations, rate of output, and investments of regulated 
firms, to the end of securing social-optimal price-output 
adjustments. Only by thus increasing the regulatory powers 
of commissioners does it seem possible to compensate for the 
loss of private management incentive for efficiency, bold 
expansion, and so forth which results from the rigid control 
of rates and profits. 
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This last suggestion is repugnant to those who believe in economic 
freedom and the basic concepts of a competitive society. Many persons are 
also distrustful of increasing government regulation and control. 
Lack of Information 
The accusation has therefore been made that regulation has failed to 
motivate utility managers to strive for exceptional performance, and many 
suggestions for correcting this weakness have been offered. What seems to 
be missing however is a thorough understanding of the attitudes and 
opinions of those closest to the situation, that is the utility managers 
and the commissioners and their staff. There is a need for information 
regarding the influence of regulation upon managerial performance, and 
this information must come from those closest to the situation. If there 
is a weakness in the regulatory process, it must be recognized by these 
concerned individuals and properly identified before any satisfactory 
solution can be devised. There must also be some basis for agreement 
among the interested parties concerning the actual problem before there 
will be cooperation in achieving a satisfactory solution. 
Research Proposed 
The gas, electric, and telephone industries are of vital importance 
to our national economy. Any improvement in the regulatory process which 
would encourage an improvement of performance within these industries would 
be beneficial to all of society. 
A need was recognized for research which would provide increased 
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understanding about the attitudes and opinions of utility managers and 
commissioners and staff members concerning the effect of regulation on 
managerial performance. In the hopes of furthering a healthy business 
climate within these industries such that they may contribute the fullest 
possible to our increasing social benefits, it was proposed that the 
following three hypotheses be tested via an attitude survey. 
Hypothesis I. Utility managers and commission personnel (as groups) 
have the opinion that regulation currently assures only 
average performance and to a degree penalizes efficient 
management. 
Hypothesis II. Utility managers and commission personnel (as groups) 
have the opinion that it is possible to obtain a measure 
of managerial performance. 
Hypothesis III. Utility managers and commission personnel (as groups) 
have the opinion that research is needed on a method or 
methods for motivation of management. 
Two hypotheses of secondary importance were also to be considered in 
this attitude study. 
Hypothesis IV. Telephone managers, as a group, have opinions which differ 
from those held by gas and electric utility managers. 
These opinions express a more positive agreement with 
Hypotheses I, II, and III. 
Hypothesis V. Utility managers consider exceptional performance in 
areas related to personnel supervision as indicative of 
exceptional managerial performance. 
In addition to the above hypotheses, information regarding the atti­
tudes and opinions of utility managers and commission personnel on the 
following questions was desired. 
Question 1. What action by regulatory bodies would motivate exceptional 
managerial performance? 
Question 2. What effect should regulation have on managerial performance? 
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Question 3. What criteria are considered an index of exceptional manage­
rial performance? 
An alternative to investor-owned telephone, gas, and electric 
utilities is outright public ownership of these industries. In the United 
States, however, private ownership has been the more common form of 
business organization with a state regulatory body providing the necessary 
public control (20, p. 3). 
The object of this study was to clarify the effect which state 
regulation has had and/or should have on the incentive for exceptional 
managerial performance within investor-owned telephone, gas, and electric 
utilities. The influence and effect of regulatory action, if any, upon 
public and consumer-owned utilities was not considered as a part of this 
study. 
It is hoped that this study will aid in the improvement of the 
regulatory process such that private utility industries, while making an 
excellent contribution to the growth and prosperity of our nation in the 
past, may contribute even more fully in the future. 
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REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
This review of literature was undertaken to provide an understanding 
I 
and appreciation of the opinions expressed on the following topics by 
economists, utility managers, commissioners and others interested in regu­
lation. 
1. The effect of regulation on managerial performance. 
I 
2. The effect which regulation should have on managerial performance. 
3. The need for research in the area of regulation and its influence 
on managerial performance. 
4. The possibility of measuring managerial performance. 
Effect of Regulation on Managerial Performance 
With few exceptions, writers have expressed the opinion that regula­
tion of private business tends to remove management's incentive for 
efficiency and inovation. It is interesting to note that there seems to 
have been little, if any, change in this opinion since the early 1900's. 
In 1910 Croly (30, p. 369), a leading political thinker of his day, voiced 
his criticism of the type of regulation provided by the New York Public 
Service Commission which "deprived" an individual of incentive. In 1911, 
Prof, Taussig (114, p. 416) recognized that direct control of profits and 
prices by the regulatory body tended to remove "the stimulus to efficiency 
and progress". Chutter (26, p. 329), an electric utility specialist with 
Massachusetts Investors Trust, said in 1963; 
If all the benefits from good management are siphoned off 
for the benefit of the rate payer, the stimulating reward 
for superior management will be missing. 
14 
Whitten (136, p. 710) in 1913 wrote that restricting a company's return 
to a fixed rate would "... tend to discourage enterprise and economy in 
management." 
In 1923, Morgan (78, p. 110) wrote: 
By taking the utility business off a speculative basis and by 
assuring the receiving of a return regardless of the amount of 
effort put forth by the managements, a condition is created in 
which it is humanly impossible not to expect some tendency to 
slacken one's efforts and to let the public bear the burden of 
diminished efficiency. 
Nash (81, p. 110) wrote in 1925 that, 
I 
In time it must become obvious to utility managers that, 
under prevailing regulatory methods, there is no definite 
incentive for continued adoption of new devices which will 
save labor or other operating costs when the result of the 
savings are . . . passed along to patrons through rate 
reductions. 
Trachsel (120, p. 334) indicated in 1947 that: 
. . .  a s  r e g u l a t i o n  b e c o m e s  m o r e  e f f e c t i v e ,  t h e r e  i s  d a n g e r  
that utility management may show less initiative in intro­
ducing new economies and more efficient methods of 
administration. 
I 
Bain (7, pp. 595 and 599) wrote in 1959: 
Existing public utility regulation is subject to a number of 
serious deficiencies as a means for securing the best in market 
performance from regulated industries, . . . 
One of these deficiencies is ". . . the fact that it seriously 
reduces private-enterprise incentives for efficiency in general." 
In 1963 Trebing (121, p. 22) wrote: 
Perhaps the most serious accusation to be leveled against the 
commission system in recent years is the charge that regulation 
stifles incentives for inovatlon and greater efficiency. 
I 
Finally, in 1963, Prof. Morton (79, p. 371) stated; 
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If there is no hope of profit or if every act that raises 
profit is offset by a regulatory act that reduces it, the 
normal incentives which motivate business operation are 
impaired. 
Between 1910 and 1964 many others expressed this same opinion, that 
regulation removed the incentive for exceptional and efficient managerial 
performance (138, p. 351; 108; 131, p. 21; 90; 98, p. 224; 81, pp. 110 and 
234; 68, p. 122). 
Bauer (11, p. 330) and Nash (82, p. 290) acknowledged the theory 
behind these opinions but their observations of managerial performance in 
actual practice did not substantiate these conclusions. Other writers also 
failed to agree that management incentives were stifled by regulation (1, 
p. 39; 43, p. 129; 13, p. 414). Bauer (11, p. 348) did recognize however 
that the problem of efficiency in public utilities was exceedingly 
important. 
This indicates that the regulatory process has often been criticized 
for negating in regulated industries the incentive for efficiency and 
I 
inovation, which theoretically is automatically insured under competitive 
conditions (122, p. 122). Massel (75, p. 26), however, reports in a study 
of competition and monopoly, that 
, . • there is no organized body of field analysis to estab­
lish that, on the whole, efficiency is increased under 
competitive conditions. Nor is there clear evidence that 
monopolistic elements increase profits significantly. 
Even so, economic theory still presents the precept that pure 
competition leads to efficient allocation of goods and services and 
monopoly to exploitation and excess profits (69, 8). 
16 
Outside factors influencing efficiency 
Trebing (121) identifies and discusses a number of factors outside the 
regulatory process which influence efficient managerial performance. 
Technological advances affecting equipment efficiencies coupled with 
I 
the phenomenal growth of the electric, gas and telephone industries since 
1900 have resulted in significant increases in physical productivity for 
each of the industries. 
Although these industries are considered monopolistic, there is a 
certain degree of competition with other industries and within each 
industry. 
Inflation often creates the need for improved managerial performance 
and increased efficiencies in order to maintain a particular profit level, 
let alone increase profits. 
Finally, there is a certain amount of professional pride which 
motivates a manager to perform as best he knows how regardless of the 
regulatory effect. 
Trebing indicates that these factors influence management to perform 
in an efficient and exceptional manner, but referring to regulation he 
writes that: 
The force dampening incentives is almost entirely a function 
of regulatory technique, while the countervailing force for 
efficiency is largely a product of factors operating outside 
or independent of the ambit of regulation. (121, p. 27) 
This justifies, he feels, a consideration of how the regulatory 
process might provide increased incentive and motivation to management. 
17 
What Effect Should Regulation Have 
on Managerial Performance? 
While there is some degree of agreement about the theoretical effect 
of regulation upon managerial performance, the suggested methods for 
correcting the situation are quite diverse. Some authors merely express 
the opinion that good management of an enterprise should be encouraged and 
rewarded (45, p. 150; 74; 50; 72; 34; 131; 93; 79; 2; 111; 16; 104). 
Motivating managerial performance 
The many methods which have been suggested for motivating public 
utility management can be conveniently grouped according to the manner in 
which the incentive is provided. 
1. Through the rate of return. 
2. Through a non-pecuniary factor. 
3. Through the rate base. 
4. Through increased regulatory control. 
Rate of return Phillips (93) expressed the opinion that too little 
had been done in determining what should be considered in the fair rate of 
return. Other authors, in discussing the rate of return, failed to mention 
efficiency of management as an influential factor (53, p. 351-352; 113; 63; 
42, p. 385; 52; 17). Often though, the rate of return was the median by 
which an incentive was provided to management. 
Raymond (99, p. 113) and Untereiner (126, p. 353) expressed the opinion 
that only the rates charged to the consumer should be regulated. Once rates 
have been set which allow for reasonable costs and allow a fair profit, then 
the enterprise (the utility) should be allowed to earn as much more as it 
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can above this fair profit provided it does so honestly and fairly. 
Raymond, in 1918, (99, p. 113) suggested that: 
. . . the fair return to a public utility corporation is any 
return it is able to earn by fair and honorable dealing so 
long as it is not more than successful men in other business 
of equal risk and magnitude earn on honestly and reasonably 
invested capital. 
And, in 1963, Untereiner (126, p. 353) said that the utility should be 
allowed to 
. . . make the best profit it can at the rates prescribed 
for it. Let it make 12% or 20%iif it's good enough; and 
let it go bankrupt if it's bad enough. 
Prendergast (96, p. 190) and Nash (82, p. 291) expressed similar 
opinions. 
These are considered extreme suggestions, for it generally is con­
ceded by academic and political students that the earnings of a utility 
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enterprise should be controlled to some degree (82, pp. 291-292; 79). 
The consumer would express dissatisfaction if a utility were allowed to 
earn a very high rate of return even though the customers' service and 
rates were reasonable and fair (61, p. 263). 
The regulatory process generally regulates rates and profits, through 
the allowance of a fair rate of return. The popular suggestion therefore 
is for the commission in a rate increase hearing, to permit an increase 
in the utility's allowed rate of return provided management can 
demonstrate exceptional or efficient performance. As an example, if the 
rate of return normally allowed a utility with average managerial 
performance was 6%, the commission might allow an efficiently managed 
utility a return of 7% on their invested capital. This method for providing 
incentive to management has been suggested by many of the writers (41, 
pp. 432-433; 96, p. 183; 95, p. 1038; 45, p. 150; 81, p. 110; 136, p. 
1877; 14, p. 14; 21, p. 222; 104; 115, p. 351; 120, p. 334). 
A negative approach is also suggested (120, p. 334; 103; 21, p. 222; 
9, p. 532). This approach is simply that of penalizing poor managerial 
performance by reducing the utility's allowed rate of return on the 
invested capital or by refusing to allow the utility a rate increase when 
management practices are cWsTdef ed^'To 'be'" be low average and inefficient. 
According to these suggestions, management should be required to correct 
its inefficient practices before the regulatory body would consider a 
rate increase for the utility. 
Petteway (92) feels that the rate of return should be a "zone of 
reasonableness" which is really a combination of the positive and negative 
approaches given above. In this respect it is suggested that management 
can be motivated by allowing the efficient utilities to earn a return in 
the upper portion of the zone without the regulatory body initiating a 
rate hearing. Likewise, the inefficiently managed utilities would be 
relegated to the lower range of the zone until they improved their 
performance. Others offer similar suggestions (139, p. 170; 21, p. 222; 
110; 133; 79). 
In a similar vein are suggestions regarding profit sharing between 
utilities and consumers. Jones et al. (59, p. 268) presents an arrangement 
where the increased return over and above the fair rate of return, or the 
allowed rate of return, which is due to managerial efficiency, is shared 
by the company and the consumer on a 50-50 basis. Thus, if a utility were 
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allowed to earn a return of 6% and they were to actually earn 7% due to -
exceptional managerial performance and efficiencies, then the company 
would be allowed to keep 1/2% and would return to the consumer 1/2% 
either as a refund or a rate reduction in the following year. Similar 
profits sharing suggestions have been made by others (136, p. 710; 45; 
138, p. 587; 108, p. 33; 23, p. 192). 
Bussing (22) reported in 1936 on a study of the so-called sliding 
scale plans. Sliding scale plans were originally conceived as a means 
of providing an automatic adjustment to the allowed rate of return as a 
utility demonstrated its increased efficiency. They were based upon the 
premise that a reduction in rates by a utility was indicative of increased 
efficiency and entitled the utility to an increased rate of return. These 
plans were intended to motivate efficient managerial performance and were 
popular between 1900 and about 1930. Early writers felt these plans had 
great potential (98, p. 224; 78; 68, p. 122; 96, p. 191), but on the 
whole they have not lived up to their expectations (128, 33, 50). 
Barnes (9) and Smith (107, p. 71) felt that management needed to 
prove it was efficient before the utility received a fair rate of return. 
No increase in the utility's rate of return for efficient managerial 
performance was appropriate. Barnes (9, p. 532) justified this position 
by his interpretation of the Supreme Court's decision in the Bluefield 
case. He believed that the Court made 
. . . "efficient and economical management" a prerequisite 
to the utility's claim to either a nonconfiscatory or a 
reasonable rate of return, 
Knapp (60, p. 748) interpreted the actions of regulatory bodies as 
21 
I 
appearing . .to view efficient and economical management as an implied 
prerequisite for the obtaining of a fair rate of return upon application 
by a utility." Providing management with an incentive by allowing the 
utility a differential rate of return, while the most popular suggestion, 
was at times criticised because the rate of return was a reward to the 
stockholders and not to management or the workers (11, p. 532; 78; 9, p. 
532). 
Because of this, many have indicated that the only proper motivation 
for management should be adequate wages and salaries, and possibly a 
sharing of profits based on the individual manager's contribution (13, p. 
416; 115, pp. 49-51; 11, pp. 343-344; 78, p. 315; 120, p. 334; 116, p. 351; 
107, p. 70). A study by American Telephone and Telegraph Co. (2, p. 70) 
however found that, "In all of regulated industry, no company was found 
with a formal system of rewards and penalties for its people based on 
their profit performance." 
Non-pecuniary factors Morgan (78, pp. 133-138) in 1923 wrote of 
non-pecuniary incentives. These were emulation or personal competition with 
other managers; a desire to serve the community and state; a professional 
pride in advancing the art of management regardless of reward; and a 
desire for personal satisfaction based on recognition by ones contempo­
raries and associates. Bauer (11, p. 339) also expressed the opinion that 
. . . one of the chief forces promoting efficiency would be a 
systematic appeal to the public spirit and professional pride 
not only of the operating officials but also department heads 
and all employees. 
Bernstein (15, p. 219) also reports that all incentives, including 
psychological and emotional incentives, have not been used extensively 
and that regulatory agencies have taken little interest in developing 
their potential. 
Rate base The rate base has generally been regarded as inappro­
priate for use in providing an incentive to management (13, p. 417; 23, 
p. 192; 116, p. 351; 12). 
Smith (107) however presents an interesting argument for its use and 
Morgan (79) recognized its possibilities in 1923 (79, pp. 278-283). 
Smith (107, pp. 71-74) recognized that during the rate hearing the 
commission considers the expenses and investments which a utility has made 
in the past. He suggests that the commission should disallow all expenses 
and investments which are excessive or imprudent and considered in excess 
of that expected of an efficient and well managed utility. This would be 
the penalty for inefficient management. A penalty. Smith feels, which 
would be more direct and specific than would be a reduction in the rate of 
return. 
Increased commission control Increased commission control might 
be considered a negative approach to incentive. Those who are of the 
opinion that the commission needs more control feel that only through 
increased and extensive commission control can management be motivated 
toward desirable performance. Bain (7, p. 630) strongly urges this 
position saying: 
. . . commissions charged with the regulation of existing 
utilities should in general be given more power, so that 
instead of in large part simply limiting (or supporting) 
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rates to cover average costs, they could in addition (under 
adequate legislative standards) control or establish the 
scale of operations, rate of output, and investments or regu­
lated firms, to the end of securing socially optimal price-
output adjustments. Only by thus increasing the regulatory 
powers of commissions does it seem possible to compensate for 
the loss of private management incentives for efficiency, bold 
expansion, and so forth which results from the rigid control 
of rates and profits. 
The need for increased commission control over managerial performance 
has also been suggested by others (11, pp. 331-335; 12, p. 237; 13, pp. 413 
and 418). 
Court rulings on regulation and managerial performance 
The rulings of the courts reflect the court's opinions and also 
influence the attitudes of others. Two cases which date back to 1923 
still remain significant today because of their reference to managerial 
efficiency. 
State of Missouri vs. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company The 
first case involved the state of Missouri and the Southwestern Bell 
Telephone Company. Justice Brandeis (110, p. 291), in his dissenting 
opinion made this statement: 
The compensation which the constitution guarantees an 
opportunity to earn is the reasonable cost of conducting 
the business. Cost includes not only operating expenses 
but also capital charges. Capital charges cover the allowance, 
by way of interest, for the use of the capital, whatever the 
nature of the security issued therefor; the allowance for risk 
incurred; and enough more to attract capital. The reasonable 
rate to be prescribed by a commission may allow an efficiently 
managed utility much more. But a rate is constitutionally 
compensatory, if it allows to the utility the opportunity to 
earn the cost of the service as thus defined, (underline added) 
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Bluefield Water Works case The next month, June, 1923, the court 
ruled in the Bluefield Water Works case (18). This case, like the previous 
I 
one, was concerned with the setting of the rate base but the decision made 
reference to the rate of return. 
The company contends that the rate of return is too low and 
confiscatory. What annual rate will constitute just compensa­
tion depends upon many circumstances and must be determined by 
the exercise of a fair and enlightened judgment, having regard 
to all relevant facts. A public utility is entitled to such 
rates as will permit it to earn a return on the value of the 
property which it employs for the convenience of the public 
equal to that generally being made at the same time and in the 
same general part of the country on investments in other busi­
ness undertakings which are attended by corresponding risks and 
uncertainties; but it has no constitutional right to profits 
such as are realized pr anticipated in highly profitable enter­
prises or speculative ventures. The return should be reasonably 
sufficient to assure confidence in the financial soundness of 
the utility and should be adequate, under efficient and economical 
management, to maintain and support its credit and enable it to 
raise the money necessary for the proper discharge of its public 
duties. A rate of return may be reasonable at one time and 
become too high or too low by changes affecting opportunities 
for investment, the money market and business conditions 
generally. (18, pp. 693-692) (underline added) 
This ruling has been interpreted by some to mean that the utility 
must be efficient and economically managed before it receives the fair 
rate of return, and by others to mean that a utility which is "under 
efficient and economical management" should receive a higher rate of 
return. Certainly it does imply that the efficient and economical 
managed utility should receive a higher rate of return than a utility 
which is not so managed, but it does not give a guide as to what that rate 
of return should be quantitatively. 
Hope Natural Gas case The courts decision in the Hope Natural 
Gas case (35) does not negate these decisions, but, in fact, seems to 
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substantiate them. 
From the investor or company point of view it is important 
that there be enough revenue not only for operating expenses 
but also for the capital costs of the business. These include 
service on the debt and dividends on the stock. 
By that standard the return to the equity owner should be 
commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises 
having corresponding risks. That return, moreover, should be 
sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of 
the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to attract 
capital. 
The court refers to the Southwestern Bell case noted earlier and the 
quotation given and then states, "The conditions under which more or less 
might be allowed are not important here." (35, p. 603) 
In the Hope case, the court limits its jurisdiction by stating: 
It is not theory but the impact of the rate order which 
counts. If the total effect of the rate order cannot be 
said to be unjust and unreasonable, judicial inquiry under 
the Act is at an end. The fact that the method employed 
to reach that result may contain infirmities is not then 
important. (35, p. 602) 
Commission attitudes 
The decisions of the commissions have been reviewed periodically so 
as to understand their attitudes on the question of rewarding managerial 
efficiency. After such a review in 1926, Spurr (109, pp. 103-104) con­
cluded that most commissions felt they should reward a utility if the 
utility were efficiently managed. He was unable to determine, however, 
"how much" of a reward should be given. 
While there are many general statements of the policy of 
the commissions in respect to efficient management, not 
much is to be found in the cases to indicate to what extent 
the commissions have gone or will go to reward such manage­
ment. It is certain that more has been allowed where the 
I 
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management has been efficient than in cases where it has been 
inefficient, but how much more has been allowed for high 
efficiency than for reasonable efficiency is hard to make out. 
Knapp (60, p. 748) reported that the courts have also failed to 
specify any portion of the rate of return as a reward due to efficient 
management. 
Cabot, in 1927 (23, p. 192), reviewed an Illinois public Utilities 
Commission decision which said in part: 
A utility which is excellently managed, progressive in develop­
ment, alive to the public requirements, aggressive in securing 
new business, economical in operations, courteous to consumers, 
and fundamentally honest in all transactions, should receive 
greater consideration in the fixing of a fair rate of return 
than should a utility of which the reverse is true. 
Nash (81, p. 237) came to the same conclusion after a similar review 
of commission decisions saying, "It appears . . . that the commissions 
are of the opinion that efficiency and progressiveness should be rewarded 
by a higher rate of return." 
A decision by the Idaho Commission in 1916 was considered a typical 
commission policy by Bernstein (14, p. 14). This decision recognized 
I 
". . . the efficiency in operation and economy in management" in deter­
mining the rate of return. He concluded that the courts and commissions, 
when considering the appropriate rate of return, took into account the 
interest rate, the risk, and the efficiency and economy of management. 
Glaeser in 1927 (41, pp. 432-433) was not in agreement with this 
opinion, saying: 
While commissions have given lip service to the principle that 
efficiency should be rewarded, they have in practice failed 
measurably to recognize it. There seems to be a good deal of 
truth in the charge sometimes made that regulation has a 
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tendency to treat all management as of the same level of 
efficiency. 
Oxenfelds (90) said in 1962 that almost no public utility commission 
provided a strong financial incentive to spur inovation. 
And, in 1956, Public Utilities Fortnightly reported on a review of 
commission decisions which related to managerial efficiency and the rate 
of return. They reported that in addition to "giving verbal encouragement 
to efficiency, the commissions have repeatedly asserted a policy of reward­
ing exceptional managerial ability by allowing a higher than ordinary rate 
of return (70, p. 561). 
Review of commission decisions 1954-1963 Commission decisions 
reported in Public Utilities Reports for the years 1954 through 1963 were 
reviewed for references to managerial efficiency. For these 10 years 
there were only 19 references covering 17 commission decisions. Three of 
the decisions did not apply to this study. Eight of the decisions dealt 
with utilities considered inefficient by the commission and as a result of 
this inefficiency the utility was granted either a lower rate of return than 
requested or the rate increase was withheld (37, 24, 84, 54, 89, 87, 88, 86). 
Two decisions indicated that the quality of management should be considered 
by the commission but gave no guide as to the degree of influence it should 
have (85, 66). Two decisions indicated that managerial efficiency was a 
prerequisite for a fair rate of return (32, 67). One decision granted an 
0.2% increase in the allowed rate of return because of efficient manage­
ment (83). 
The last decision, handed down by the Florida Railroad and Public 
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Utility Commission in 1962, is particularly noteworthy to this study. 
Quoting from this decision, the commission said (38, p. 255): ' 
In discussing the rate of return, it might be well first 
to observe that neither the statutes of this state nor the 
orders of this commission guarantee any utility that it will 
earn a specific return. The law and our orders contemplate 
nothing more than that a public utility shall have an oppor­
tunity to earn a fair and reasonable return. 
The decision then noted the fact that the utility before the commis­
sion had earned less than the rate previously allowed. Their comment 
regarding this was as follows: 
Of course, many things can combine to bring about such a 
result. Inefficient operations sometimes penalize the guilty 
utility and this matter of efficiency compared with inefficiency 
in the operations of a public utility has given rise to 
considerable controversy in regulatory circles as to the 
impact of efficiency, or the lack of it, should have in 
fixing the allowable return. It does not appear to be reason­
able to penalize a public utility's customers or subscribers 
for the inefficiencies of the utility. It would seem more 
reasonable that a public utility should be allowed something 
more in the rate of return if it has demonstrated its ability 
to operate efficiently. While it is difficult to accurately 
evaluate this factor because of its imponderable nature, it 
would appear reasonable to conclude that a public utility is 
operating efficiently if it has a minimum of service complaints, 
is continually improving its service, but is still able to 
produce higher earnings on lower rates than comparable or 
similar utilities in the general area. 
This review indicated that commissions, in the past few years, have 
not often noted in their decisions that efficient management has affected 
their decision, if in fact it has. In a few cases inefficiency has re­
sulted in the commission allowing a reduced rate of return or in refusing 
to grant a rate increase, but actually, little evidence is found to 
indicate whether commissions have or have not given recognition to effi­
cient managerial performance during a rate hearing. 
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Need for Research 
Commissions face two problems if they are to consider the rewarding 
of utilities for efficient and exceptional management. First, the diffi­
culty of measuring managerial performance quantitatively or qualitatively, 
and second, the difficulty of determining or selecting a method for 
I 
recognizing exceptional management performance or for penalizing 
inefficient management. 
Bonbright recognized the difficulty in rewarding efficient management 
(12, p. 264) stating: • 
It lies in the absence, at the present state of public utility 
regulation, of adequate objective tests of relative efficiency 
in the performance of public services. 
Petteway, in discussing Florida's regulatory climate felt that 
managerial efficiency should be recognized and rewarded in some affirma­
tive manner by the regulatory body. He realized though that "... one of 
the problems is in measuring the efficiency. Another problem involves the 
means by which the utility can be rewarded for such efficiency." (92, p. 
41) 
In 1926, Spurr (109) noted that management needed to be responsible 
for some sort of a measure or standard. 
Smith in 1932 (107, p. 194) wrote of the need for cost and service 
standards, recognizing that: 
Such standards are exceedingly difficult to develop, but i 
^ without them rate regulation consistent with the promotion 
of economic efficiency in production is impossible. 
Others have expressed a similar awareness of the need for adequate 
standards for measuring managerial performance and the difficulty in 
/ 
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devising such standards (96, p. 180; 120, p. 334; 138, p. 587; 9, p. 291; 
13, p. 417; 59, p. 268). 
Welch (131) felt that more effort could be made to measure a utility's 
performance. 
Trebing (121, p. 31) felt that 
A system of incentive regulation should attempt to create 
a regulatory environment conducive to the continuous improve­
ment in productivity. The paramount requisite of such a 
system is that it possess a reputable norm or standard by 
which to judge relative performance. Furthermore, the 
standard and attendant deviations should be capable of 
effective measurement in periods of inflation and deflation 
as well as in periods of price stability . . . 
Bauer and Gold (13, p. 413) while not in favor of providing an in­
centive to management by an increased rate of return, felt that this 
factor needed extensive study, even though its ultimate significance was 
conjectural. 
I 
Possibility of Measuring Managerial Performance 
Wilson et al. (139, p. 170) review the report by the Commission on 
Revision of Public Service Commission Laws of the State of New York which 
offered five criteria to consider in evaluating management. 
1. The lowness of the rates 
2. The continuity of the service 
3. The security of the service 
4. The excellence of public relations 
5. The qualifications and training of the employees, and reason­
ableness of the wages of the employees. 
Appropriately they recognized the need for much further research and 
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study in this area before an effective plan would be devised to divide the 
benefits of efficiency between the stockholder, consumer and management. 
The Florida Commission in a decision referred to earlier, (p. ), 
indicated that a 
. . . public utility is operating efficiently if it has a 
minimum of service complaints, is continuously improving its 
service, but is still able to produce higher earnings on 
lower rates than comparable or similar utilities in the general 
area. (38, p. 255) 
Petteway (92, p. 42), referred to this decision saying it 
. . .  i s  t h e  o n l y  d e c i s i o n  b y  a  r e g u l a t o r y  a g e n c y ,  s o  f a r  a s  
we have been able to ascertain, where any attempt has been 
made to establish any kind of guide lines for measuring 
efficiency in public utility management. 
Others have tried to devise a standard or yardstick which would 
provide more of an objective measure of managerial performance. lulo (55, 
56) reports of research for the purpose of determining the relationship 
between quantitative cost information and managerial efficiency. This 
study used Federal Power Commission statistics and segregated seven factors 
which were found to affect unit costs significantly. The relative im­
portance of each factor was then determined and used to estimate expected 
unit costs of actual operation. These expected costs then became the 
standard against which actual operation costs were compared. Those 
companies which had unit costs higher than the estimate were considered 
inefficient, while those utilities whose unit costs were lower than the 
standard were considered efficient. 
Trebing (121, p. 32) is currently doing research on a method for 
measuring a utility's relative performance by 
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estimating a given utility's real productivity directly and 
comparing the result with a standard or norm that represents 
the real resource expenditure required to produce the utility 
service under conditions of average managerial prudence and 
competence. 
Guercken (46) has also used Federal Power Commission statistics to 
compute an "operational performance index" which he uses as an indicator 
of managerial efficiency. He used generating costs, production and 
transmission costs, distribution expenses, and customer accounting 
expenses in computing this index. 
While an objective measure would be most desirable, Adams and Gray 
I 
(1, p. 39) quote Judge Wyzanski who states that there cannot be an 
"objective measuring rod" of managerial performance in public utilities 
but of necessity the measure must be highly subjective or largely 
theoretical. Koontz and Gable agree (61, p. 263). 
Management a:nd commissions have developed informal standards of 
managerial performance, and while these standards are appreciably high, 
they apparently are not unduly demanding (70). 
The American Institute of Management has developed a "Management 
Audit" (71, 73). This "Audit" is purported to evaluate the excellence of 
management based upon the appraisal and rating of a management in ten 
categories. The categories are economic function, corporate structure, 
health of earnings, service to stockowners, research and development, 
directorate analysis, fiscal policies, production efficiency, sales vigor, 
and executive evaluation (73, p. 4). A similar approach was suggested and 
discussed by Rose in The Management Audit (102). 
Morgan (79) and Whitten (133, p. 227) earlier had reported on merit 
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rating plans for evaluating management. Whitten notes: 
The merit rating method is one under which a commission will 
periodically rate the companies on a basis of comparative 
efficiency in serving the public and allow them to earn 
dividends varying with such efficiency. The aim will be to 
offer to capital and management a premium for such economy and 
efficiency as inures to the benefit of the consumer in better 
service or lower rates of charge. ^ 
Such a rating was suggested every five years, and then the allowed 
dividends determined according to the rating received. 
Recapitulation 
This review of the literature pertaining to regulation and managerial 
efficiency has indicated the following: 
First: Many authors, including economists and academicians, have expressed 
the opinion that regulation tends to reduce management's incentive 
for exceptional performance. 
Second: Many authors have expressed the opinion that regulation should 
provide an incentive to management. The most popular suggestion is 
to provide an increased rate oi return to those enterprises (utili­
ties) which are efficiently managed. A reduced rate of return is 
I 
often suggested as a penalty for inefficient management. 
Third: While the courts and commissions have verbally subscribed to the 
theory that a utility should be rewarded for efficient management, 
there is little evidence from the past ten years to indicate that 
they are actually doing this. 
Fourth: Economists and academicians have expressed the opinion that 
research is needed on standards for measuring managerial efficiency. 
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Research is also needed into different methods for rewarding such 
efficiency. The attitudes and opinions of the commissioners and 
their staff, as well as utility managers, is not definitely known. 
Fifth: Recent research on methods for measuring managerial performance 
indicates the opinion that such a measure can be obtained. At the 
present time no indication of the reliability of these measures is 
given. Information is lacking about the attitudes of commissioners 
and utility managers on ^ the possibility of measuring managerial 
performance. 
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METHOD OF APPROACH 
The purpose of this study was to test the hypotheses offered in the 
introduction. They were: 
Hypothesis I Utility managers and commission personnel (as groups) hold 
the opinion that regulation currently assures only average 
performance and to a degree penalizes efficient management. 
Hypothesis II Utility managers and commission personnel (as groups) hold 
the opinion that it is possible to obtain a measure of 
managerial performance. 
Hypothesis III Utility managers and commission personnel (as groups) hold 
the opinion that research is needed on a method or methods 
for motivating management. 
Research Tool 
The "attitude questionnaire" was selected as the research tool for use 
in this study, for it could be specifically designed to appraise an 
individual's favorableness toward some group, social institution or social 
concept (117, p. 394). In this study the questionnaire was utilized as a 
tool for measuring opinions and attitudes of regulators and utility 
managers which pertained to the hypotheses. 
Thurstone (118, p. 607) considers "attitude" to 
. . . denote the sum-total of a man's inclinations and feelings, 
prejudice or bias, pre-conceived notions, ideas, fears, threats, 
and convictions about any specific topic. 
The verbal expression of an attitude is considered to be an opinion. 
The typical attitude questionnaire consists of a group of statements. 
each representing an opinion about a specific topic, or attitude variable, 
and is used to measure a subject's attitude as expressed by his acceptance 
or rejection of each statement in the questionnaire (117, p. 395). The 
"attitude variable" refers to the range ot attitudes which may be held by 
many different individuals about a specific topic. The attitude variable 
can be thought of as a continuum with a base line which represents the 
positions of the different attitudes. In specifying the attitude variable, 
it was necessary that it be stated so one could speak of it in terms of 
favorableness or unfavorableness, or in terms of agreement or disagreement. 
This attitude study was concerned with allocating the responding individu­
als along the attitude continuum, the base line or scale of an attitude 
variable, based on the statements each respondent accepted or rejected. 
Interpretation of Responses 
The method utilized to design the attitude questionnaire in this study 
was based on the previous work by Thurstone (118) and Wolins (140). It is 
assumed that each individual has an attitude, a standard of reference, 
against which he will compare each statement on the attitude questionnaire. 
After making this comparison he will respond to the statement according to 
some monotonically increasing function of his attitude about the subject 
matter expressed by the statement. Psychological theories agree that a 
stimulus generates within a person a discriminai dispersion. That is, if 
we were to present the same statement to the same person for a number of 
times, the person's perception of the statement would be different from 
time to time. The variance of the resulting frequency distribution might 
be relatively homogenous from statement to statement. The desirable 
response would be for a person to reply according to his judgement of the 
distance between the stimulus, the statement, and his standard. 
If each person did this, and the variance of their discriminai 
dispersions were equal, then linearity would occur. Apparently people do 
not do this, but instead their judgements appear to be proportional to the 
area under that portion of the discriminai density distribution which lies 
above each person's standard. That is, referring to Figure 1, if a person 
were asked to judge A, the distance between his standard and the way in 
which he perceived the statement, he apparently responds with a number 
which is proportional to the shaded area of his discriminai dispersion. 
In this survey the individual was asked to judge directly what he 
seemed to be judging anyway. Each participant was therefore asked to 
respond to each statement on the attitude questionnaire according to how 
certain he was that the statement exceeded his standard. The response 
given was then considered proportional to the area under that individual's 
hypothetical discriminai dispersion. 
Selection of Attitude Variable 
In designing the attitude questionnaire, the first step was to select 
the attitude variables. The following attitude variables were judged by 
this investigator to be important for testing the hypotheses offered. 
Attitude Variable I : To what degree does regulation currently 
influence managerial performance? 
This attitude variable represents attitudes which pertain to the first 
hypothesis. Statements representing opinions within this attitude variable 
Individual's 
standard 
reference 
High perception 
of 
stimulus 
Low perception 
of 
stimulus 
Figure 1. Hypothetical discriminai dispersion distribution generated by a stimulus 
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will vary from the highly favorable one, which states that current regula­
tion motivates efficient management and provides a positive influence upon 
r managerial performance, to the highly unfavorable one, which states that 
current regulation retards or stifles managerial performance. 
Attitude Variable II: To what degree is it possible to measure 
managerial performance? 
This variable represents attitudes which pertain to the second hypothesis. 
i 
Statements representing opinions within this attitude variable will vary 
from the highly favorable one, which states that it is positively possible 
to measure managerial performance, to the highly unfavorable one, which 
states that it is impossible to measure managerial performance. 
Attitude Variable III: To what degree is research and investigation 
needed on a method or methods for providing 
incentive to utilities through regulation? 
This variable represents attitudes which pertain to the third hypothesis. 
Statements representing opinions within this attitude variable will vary 
from the highly favorable one, which states that research is needed at 
I 
once, to the highly unfavorable one, which states research is definitely 
not necessary. 
Attitude continuum 
Each of the attitude variables can be represented by an attitude 
I 
continuum, a base line or scale, with the highly favorable attitude at the 
one extreme and the unfavorable attitude at the opposite extreme. 
Attitudes representing varying degrees of favorableness or unfavorableness 
fall in between with the middle area representing an area of no opinion. 
An attitude held by any individual will fall someplace along this con­
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tinuum. It, therefore, becomes necessary in designing the attitude 
questionnaire to identify the approximate position of each statement, and 
the opinion it represents, along the attitude continuum. 
Selection of Statements 
The statements used in the attitude questionnaire are a written expres­
sion of an opinion, a verbal expression of an attitude. The statements used 
in the attitude questionnaire had to be relevent to the attitude variable, 
unambiguous, and represent different positions, different opinions, along 
the attitude continuum. These opinions needed to vary from favorable to 
unfavorable. A large number of statements were selected as representative 
of the different attitudes which might be held about attitude variable I. 
Likewise a group of statements was selected for each of the attitude 
variables II and III. 
Pre-testing of statements 
These statements had to be tested to eliminate ambiguous statements 
and to identify each statement's approximate location along the attitude 
continuum. 
This was accomplished by submitting the three sets of statements, one 
for each attitude variable, to a test group of judges with directions 
similar to those given below for attitude variable I. 
Directions: 
Following these directions are statements about the possibility of 
measuring managerial performance. We are interested in your judgment 
concerning how favorable an attitude is expressed by each statement. A 
good way to keep these directions in mind is to imagine you overheard a 
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stranger making each of these statements. Then on the basis of the 
statement the stranger made you are to indicate how certain you are that 
the stranger has a favorable attitude toward current regulatory practice 
and its effect upon managerial performance. If you can be sure the 
stranger does not have a favorable attitude by the statement he made, 
indicate this by marking "1" next to the statement. This response, "1", 
indicates the chances are 1 in one hundred that the stranger has a favor­
able attitude toward current regulatory practice and its effect upon 
managerial performance. If you can be sure the stranger does have a 
favorable attitude by the statement he made, indicate this by marking "99" 
next to the statement. This response, "99", indicates the chances are 99 
in one hundred that that stranger has a favorable attitude toward current 
regulatory practice and its effect upon managerial performance. Use 
numbers between 1 and 99 to indicate intermediate degrees of certainty 
and if you feel the statement provides no information about the attitude 
of the stranger, Indicate this by marking "50" next to the statement. 
Test group 
A test group of 28 judges was presented the three sets of statements. 
There were 39 statements under attitude variable I, 13 statements under 
attitude variable II, and 12 statements under attitude variable III. The 
initial list of statements presented to the test group is given in Appendix 
I 
A with—its introductory letter. 
Note that these judges were directed to respond according to their 
certainty that the statement given represented a favorable attitude on the 
part of a stranger and were not to respond according to their ovm agreement 
or disagreement with the statement. 
Analysis of replies 
The replies received by this initial group of judges were then analyzed 
by means of a correlation matrix to determine the intercorrelation among 
the judges. A low correlation for any judge when compared with the other 
judges indicated that this judge was definitely out of line with the 
majority, due either to a misinterpretation of the directions or to some 
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other reason. The replies of three judges who did not correlate highly 
with the other judges were eliminated before continuing the analysis of 
the replies. 
The responses of the remaining 25 judges were then used to compute, 
statement by statement, the mean response and the standard deviation. 
This information was then used to select those statements which would be 
used on the attitude questionnaire. 
Selection of statements to be used 
The mean response locates the approximate position of an opinion, 
represented by a statement, along the attitude continuum. Statements were 
selected to represent different attitudes ranging from favorable to un­
favorable. This was completed for each attitude variable. 
The standard deviation provided a measure of the ambiguity of the 
statement. A large standard deviation indicated an ambiguous statement. 
Statements were selected which had a relatively low standard deviation 
indicating statements which were relatively' unambiguous. 
There were seven statements selected as representative of a range of 
opinions about attitude variable I, seven statements were selected for 
attitude variable II, and five statements for attitude variable III. 
Attitude Questionnaire 
These statements were included in the attitude questionnaire preceded 
by directions similar to those given below for attitude variable I. 
Directions: 
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Following these directions are a group of statements about current 
regulatory practice and its effect upon managerial performance. We are 
interested in your feelings or attitude about each statement. Some of 
these statements you will probably agree with. That is, some statements 
will express your own attitudes or feelings about current regulatory 
practice and its effect upon managerial performance. Other statements will 
express attitudes or feelings opposite to yours. Still other statements 
you will be uncertain to some degree about how well it describes your 
feelings or attitudes. 
For each statement indicate how well it describes your attitude by a 
number from 1 to 99. If you are certain the statement describes your 
attitude write "99" in the space provided after the statement. If you are 
certain the statement describes an attitude opposite to yours write "1" 
in the space provided. If you are very uncertain or cannot decide if the 
statement describes your attitude write "50" in the space provided. Use 
numbers between 50 and 90 to indicate various degrees of agreement with a 
statement. Use numbers between 1 and 50 to indicate various degrees of dis­
agreement with each statement. You may wish to refer to the following scale 
in order to keep these directions in mind. 
A reproduction of the scale which followed these directions is shown 
in Figure 2. 
Additional information desired 
While the purpose of this study yas primarily to test specific 
hypotheses, it was also considered important to gather information which 
would provide insight into the answers of three questions considered in the 
introduction. It was believed that the answers to these three questions 
would also provide additional information relevant to the basic hypotheses. 
The questions were: 
Question 1: What action by regulatory bodies would motivate excep­
tional managerial performance? 
Question 2; What effect should regulation have on managerial 
performance? 
Question 3; What performance is an index of exceptional managerial 
performance? 
These questions have reference to hypothetical actions rather than 
I l l l l  I  I I  I 1  I 1  I I  I I  I 
1 : .10 20 30 40 50 60 
Disagree Uncertain 
Figure 2. Scale used on attitude survey questionnaire 
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factual situations. Statements representing opinions about these questions 
tend to be ambiguous and defy placement along an attitude continuum with 
any degree of accuracy. 
That is, it is not possible for a person to express a valid opinion 
about a hypothetical situation. Since attitudes, by definition, have a 
strong emotional basis (118), one cannot accurately anticipate emotional 
responses to hypothetical circumstances. 
It is possible however to obtain an indication of agreement or dis­
agreement with a statement. While the method of analyzing the responses to 
statements relative to these questions will differ from the method used to 
analyze the responses to attitude variables I, II, and III, the responses 
will provide useful and valuable information. 
Three groups of statements were developed to represent different 
opinions about each question and were included in the attitude survey. 
For the purpose of uniformity, the statements were identified on the ques­
tionnaire as attitude variables IV, V, and VI, and referred respectively 
to questions 1, 2, and 3. The directions heading each group of statements 
were similar to the directions given for attitude variable I. 
The completed attitude survey questionnaire is presented in Appendix 
E. 
It will be noted that additional information was requested from each 
participant to assist in classifying and analyzing the data obtained or 
i 
expected. 
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Mailing of Attitude Questionnaire 
The decision was made to send the completed questionnaire to a group 
of utility managers and to a group of commissioners and commission staff 
members. 
Letters were sent to commission chairmen on May 12 and June 4 request­
ing their assistance and cooperation. Each commission chairman was 
requested to provide the names of those individuals, commissioners and 
staff members, who would participate in the study by completing the full 
questionnaire. 
I 
In a similar manner, the utility managers were requested by letter on 
May 12 to participate in this study. The names of the utility managers 
were selected somewhat at random from the mailing list for the Engineering 
Valuation Conference. Some selection was attempted to assure respondents 
being selected from each of the states and representing the gas, electric, 
and telephone industries. 
The letters sent to the commission chairmen and to the utility 
managers are presented in Appendix B and Appendix C, 
Professor Wolins advised that a sample group of no less than 100 
participants would provide satisfactory and usable data. In the hopes of 
insuring at least this number of respondents the questionnaire was sent to 
441 utility managers. Each utility manager received a survey addressed to 
him personally. Commission chairmen responded with the individual names 
of 106 individuals to whom the survey was mailed personally. Five copies 
of the survey were mailed to those commissions who did not volunteer the 
names of specific individuals with the exception of Alaska, who was mailed 
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3 copies. This was a total of 239 copies of the attitude questionnaire 
sent to commissions and commission personnel. 
The different introductory letters included with the attitude survey 
questionnaire are presented in Appendix D. 
METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
Completed attitude survey questionnaires were received from managers 
of telephone, gas and electric industries and from commissioners and com­
mission staff personnel. Each completed questionnaire received for 
analysis was given an identification number. 
A follow-up letter was mailed July 9 to all persons receiving an 
attitude survey questionnaire. After allowing for receipt of the follow-
up letter by the respondent, all later responses were so noted to permit 
their comparison with the initial returns. Copies of the two follow-up 
letters used in requesting an early response to the attitude survey 
questionnaire are shown in Appendix F. 
Identification of Utility Groups 
A total of 170 survey questionnaires were returned for analysis as a 
part of this study. Each returned questionnaire, in addition to receiving 
an identification number, was identified according to the type of utility 
for which the respondent worked. The utility groups were identified in 
the following manner: 
Utility group 1; Responses received from managers of utilities providing 
telephone service only. 
Utility group 2: Responses received from managers of utilities providing 
gas service only. 
Utility group 3: Responses received from managers of utilities providing 
electric service only. 
Utility group 4: Responses received from managers of utilities providing 
combined gas and electric services only. 
Utility group 7: Responses received from managers of utilities providing 
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combined telephone, gas, and electric services only. 
Utility group 8: Responses received from commissioners of state regulatory 
agencies having jurisdiction over gas, electric, and 
telephone utilities. 
Utility group 9: Responses received from staff members of state regulatory 
agencies having jurisdiction over gas, electric, and 
telephone utilities. 
The distribution of the completed questionnaires by state and utility 
group is shown in Table 1. Due to insufficient returns from individual 
states, interstate comparisons and analysis was impractical. The analysis 
of the data obtained from the completed questionnaires was accordingly 
made only on a national basis. 
Scoring Responses 
The information on the first page of the questionnaire was coded for 
storage on punched cards. Each statement in the questionnaire was also 
renumbered in sequence according to Table 2. This was necessary for 
proper identification of each statement and to allow for computer analysis. 
The nature of the expected response to each statement on the attitude 
questionnaire was discussed in detail in the previous section. According­
ly, the reply given by each respondent to each statement was assumed to 
be equivalent to the area under his hypothetical discriminai dispersion 
which lies above his standard of referency for that statement. Each 
reply given by a respondent was therefore scored by converting the reply 
into its corresponding normal standard deviation as shown in Table 3. All 
subsequent analysis of the data was performed upon the scored responses 
rather than upon the direct response given. 
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Table 1. Distribution of responses by regulating state commission and 
utility group 
Utility group 
State 
commission 
Not given 
Alabama 
Arkansas 
California 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
District of 
Columbia 
Florida 
Hawaii 
Idaho 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Kentucky 
Louisiana 
Maine 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
Mississippi 
3 
1 
4 
1 
3 
3 
1 
5 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
2 
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Table 1. (Continued) 
State 
commission 
Utility group 
Missouri 1113 1 
Montana 1 
Nebraska 1 1 
New Hampshire 1 
New Jersey 2 2 5 
New Mexico 1 
New York 1 
North Carolina 2 
North Dakota 1 
Ohio 2 1 1 
Oklahoma 1 
Oregon 1 11 
Pennsylvania 2 2 3 14 
Rhode Island 1 
Texas 1 1 
Utah 1 1 
Vermont 2 2 
Virginia 2 3 
Washington 2 1 13 
West Virginia 1 
Wisconsin 2 2 2 112 
Unclassified 8 4 2 1 
Totals 1 40 29 14 30 5 15 ^ 
I 
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Table 2. Renumbering of statements within attitude survey questionnaire 
for computer analysis 
Attitude 
group 
Statements were 
numbered on attitude 
survey questionnaire 
Statements 
renumbered 
I 1 - 7  1 - 7  
II 1 - 7  8 - 1 4  
III 1 - 5  15 - 19 
IV 1 - 1 2  20 - 31 
V 1 - 9  32 - 40 
VI 1 - 2 9  41 - 69 
Table 3. Score for each response based on the normal standard deviation 
Actual Actual 
response Score [ response Score 
(unfavorable) (favorable) 
01 -2.326 50 0.000 
02 -2.054 55 +0.126 
03 -1.881 60 +0.253 
04 -1.751 65 +0.385 
05 -1.645 70 +0.524 
10 -1.282 75 +0.674 
15 -1.036 80 +0.842 
20 -0.842 85 +1.036 
25 -0.674 90 +1.282 
30 -0.524 95 +1.645 
35 -0.385 96 +1.751 
40 -0.253 97 +1.881 
45 -0.126 98 +2.054 
50 0.000 99 +2.326 
I 
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Comparison of Returns "Before" and "After" 
Follow-up Letter 
There was a possibility that the respondents who replied after 
receiving the follow-up letter held opinions which differed with those 
individuals who responded initially. This possibility required testing. 
This analysis was performed by first grouping utility managers, 
utility groups 1, 2, 3, and 4, into a "before" and an "after" group. 
This was also done for the commission personnel, utility groups 8 and 
9. Utility group 7 was not used at this time because of the small number 
of respondents within this utility group. 
The difference in mean response to each statement by those utility 
managers responding initially and those utility managers responding 
after receiving the follow-up letter was tested statistically by using 
the "Student's" t-distribution. This same analysis was performed on the 
"before" and "after" responses by commission personnel. 
Identification of Attitude Groups 
After scoring the 170 questionnaires it was necessary to verify the 
initial grouping of statements within specific attitude groups. A 
correlation matrix was obtained showing the correlation of the scored 
responses to each statement with the scored responses to every other 
statement. Statements measuring the same attitude variable show a rela­
tively high positive or negative intercorrelation, and are considered to 
be an attitude group. Those statements which indicated relatively high 
positive or negative intercorrelation were assigned to the same attitude 
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group and the attitude variable they purported to measure was then re­
considered. 
Attitude group I 
Attitude group I originally contained seven statements about current 
regulatory practice and its effect on managerial performance. Relatively 
high intercorrelation was noted between statements 1, 3, 4 and 7, and 
these statements were considered as a new group and identified as attitude 
group A. Attitude group A was recognized as a measure of attitude 
variable I. 
Attitude group II 
Attitude group II originally contained seven statements about the 
possibility of measuring managerial performance. Relatively high inter­
correlation was noted between statements 10, 11, 13 and 14, and these 
statements were considered as a new group and identified as attitude 
group B. Attitude group B was recognized as a measure of attitude 
variable II. 
Attitude group III 
Attitude group III originally contained five statements about research 
on a method or methods for providing incentive to utilities through 
regulation. Relatively high intercorrelation was noted between statements 
15, 16, 18, and 19, and these statements were considered as a new group 
and identified as attitude group C. Attitude group G was recognized as a 
measure of attitude variable III. 
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Attitude group IV 
Attitude group IV originally contained twelve statements about 
regulation and the effect which it should have upon managerial perform­
ance. Relatively high correlation was found between statements 21, 22, 
23, 25, 26, 28, 30 and 31, and these statements considered as a new group 
and identified as attitude group D. No attitude variable had been 
identified previously for the original attitude group because it covered 
hypothetical actions rather than factual situations. The nature of the 
statements comprising attitude group D suggests an attitude variable 
which expresses the degree to which regulation should go in attempting to 
motivate exceptional managerial performance. 
Attitude group V 
Attitude group V originally contained nine statements about regula­
tory action intended as motivation to achieve exceptional managerial 
performance. Relatively high intercorrelation was found between state­
ments 32, 34, 36, 37, 38, and 39, and these statements were considered as 
a new group and identified as attitude group R. As in attitude group IV, 
no attitude variable had been identified previously for the original 
attitude group. The nature of the statements with high intercorrelation 
suggested an attitude variable regarding the importance of the rate of 
return as a motivator of exceptional managerial performance. 
Attitude group VI 
Attitude group VI originally contained twenty-nine statements about 
criteria which indicate exceptional management. Relatively high correla­
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tion was found between statements 41, 42, 43 and 59, and these statements 
were considered as a new group and identified as attitude group F. Rela­
tively high intercorrelation was also noted between statements 45, 46, 48, 
49, 51, 54, 55, 58, 60, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, and 69. These statements were 
considered as a new group and identified as attitude group G. An analysis 
of the statements in attitude group F suggested an attitude variable 
relative to the importance of profit as an indicator of exceptional 
management. Statements within attitude group G suggested an attitude 
variable regarding the importance of interpersonal activities as an 
indicator of exceptional management. 
Summary of Attitude Groups 
The result of this portion of the analysis was seven groups of state­
ments, each group being identified as an attitude group and each attitude 
group measuring an attitude variable. The resulting attitude groups and 
corresponding attitude variables are summarized as follows. 
Attitude group A measuring attitude variable I: 
To what degree does regulation currently influence managerial 
performance? 
Attitude group B measuring attitude variable II: 
To what degree is it possible to measure managerial performance? 
Attitude group G measuring attitude variable III: 
To what degree is research and investigation needed on a method 
or methods for providing incentive to utilities through regula­
tion? 
Attitude group D measuring attitude variable IV: 
To what degree should regulation attempt to motivate exceptional 
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managerial performance? 
. Attitude group E measuring attitude variable V: 
To what degree is the rate of return important as a motivator 
of exceptional managerial performance? 
Attitude group F measuring attitude variable VI: 
To what degree is profit an indicator of exceptional managerial 
performance? 
Attitude group G measuring attitude variable VII: 
To what degree is the quality of a utility's interpersonal 
activities an indicator of exceptional management? 
Analysis of Scored Responses 
One individual did not identify his utility and could not be placed 
in an appropriate utility group. Each of the remaining 169 respondents 
was scored on each attitude group. An individual's attitude group score 
was determined by his scored responses to the statements comprising that 
particular attitude group. The sign was first changed on the scores for 
those statements which correlated negatively with the other statements 
within the attitude group. The individual's attitude group score was 
then the sum of the scores for each statement in the attitude group. 
The mean and standard deviation of the scores for each statement and 
for each attitude group was obtained for each utility group and for 
specific combinations of utility groups. The difference between two mean 
scores for any two utility groups or combination of groups was tested 
statistically by using the "student's" t-distribution. When and (72 
are unknown and presumed unequal and the hypothesis is that U]^ and Ug are 
equal, then the formula for t is given by Walker and Lev (127, p. 157) as 
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The findings and results based on this analysis are found in the 
next section. 
I 
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FINDINGS AND RESULTS 
This section reports the findings and results obtained in analyzing 
the data from the attitude survey questionnaire. The method of analysis 
was outlined in the preceding section. 
Questionnaires Returned 
The attitude survey questionnaire was mailed personally to 441 
utility managers across the United States. This same questionnaire was 
also mailed personally to 71 commissioners or commission staff members in 
15 states. Eight states plus the District of Columbia indicated one 
individual to receive and distribute the questionnaire and this group 
received a total of 35 questionnaires. The balance of the states did not 
respond to the original letter requesting names of individuals who would 
participate in this study and the chairmen of these 27 states were each 
mailed approximately 5 questionnaires. 
Completed questionnaires were received from 119 utility managers and 
51 commission personnel. This represented a 27% return from utility 
managers and a response from 35% of the state commissions. 
Utility managers returned 9 completed questionnaires after analysis 
of the data had begun. Approximately 31 utility managers wrote to indi­
cate their interest in the study but, for one reason or another, they were 
unable to complete and return an attitude survey questionnaire. Reasons 
for not replying included not being subjected to state regulation or for 
being subjected to federal regulation only. Other individuals indicated 
some difficulty in responding to the questionnaire because of their 
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inability to give an unqualified response to many of the statements, or 
because they were subjected to regulatory control by a number of states 
and their response would vary for each state. 
Considering these replies, however, as partial responses brings the 
total return from utility managers to 158 or approximately 36% of the 
mailing. 
A few of the commissions also replied by letter to indicate their 
decision not to complete an attitude survey questionnaire. In addition 
to some late returns this represented replies from 9 additional states 
bringing the total returns from commission personnel to 27 state commis­
sions or 52% of the states. 
Identification of Utility Group Combinations 
Each utility group was considered as a unit as well as in combination 
with other utility groups. For ease in identifying the different combina­
tions of utility groups the combination of utility group 8 and utility 
group 9 was refered to as utility group 8-9; the combination of utility 
groups 2, 3, and 4 was refered to as utility group 2-3-4; the combination 
of utility groups 1, 2, 3, and 4 was refered to as .utility group 1-4; and 
the combination of utility groups 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7 was refered to as 
utility group 1-7. 
Result of Analysis of Returns Before and 
After Follow-up Letter 
The scored responses to questionnaires received "before" and "after" 
the possible influence of the follow-up letter were analyzed for indication 
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of a possible change in the composition of either utility group 1-4 or 
utility group 8-9. A comparison of mean scores to each statement between 
"before" and "after" respondents in utility group 8-9 is shown in Figure 
3. This same comparison for respondents in utility group 1-4 is shown in 
Figure 4. Each point represents the mean scored response to one of the 
statements on the attitude survey questionnaire. Those statements with 
significantly different mean scores are circled and identified with the 
statement number. 
Within either group the mean scores of the "before" and "after" 
respondents did not differ significantly on the whole. Three statements 
showed a significant difference in mean scores within utility group 8-9 
and two statements within utility group 1-4. These differences however 
did not suggest that there was any change in the composition of the 
"before" and "after" groups. Further analysis of the data was therefor 
without differentiation regarding when the questionnaires were returned. 
Scored Response Indicative of Opinion 
A utility group's mean score on an attitude group indicates the 
utility group's opinion about the appropriate attitude variable. A 
utility group's mean score, whether for a specific statement or for an 
attitude group, has no absolute significance, and comparisons between 
statements based on the mean scores cannot be made. A utility group's 
mean score on any statement or attitude group can, however, be compared 
with other utility groups. This provides an indication of the relative 
position of each of the utility groups along the appropriate attitude 
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Utility group 8-9 "before" 
Figure 3. Mean scores by statement for "before" and "after" respondents 
w i t h i n  u t i l i t y  g r o u p  8 - 9  .  . . .  
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Utility group 1-4 "before 
Figure 4. Mean scores by statement for "before" and "after" respondents 
within utility group 1-4 
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continuum. 
Each utility groups's mean score on an attitude group was compared 
statistically with every other utility group. Those utility groups and 
the specific attitude groups where differences in mean scores tested 
significant are indicated in Figure 5 and Figure 6. Very few attitude 
group mean scores tested significantly different when utility groups 1, 2, 
3, 4, and 7 were compared or when utility group 1 was compared with 
utility group 2-3-4. A majority of the attitude group mean scores tested 
significant, however, when utility groups 1, 2-3-4, or 1-7 were compared 
with utility group 8-9. 
A comparison of the attitude group mean scores by utility group 8 
and utility group 9 found no significant differences between these two 
utility groups. 
Utility group 7 was considered individually and as a part of utility 
group 1-7. Because this utility group included only 5 respondents, no 
findings were drawn concerning this utility group individually. 
Results of Analysis of Attitude Group Scores 
Before reviewing each attitude group individually it was necessary 
to provide a guide for interpreting the relative significance of an 
attitude group mean score. 
The attitude group mean score was obtained by adding the individual 
scores for those statements within the attitude group after changing the 
sign on scores for those statements which correlated negatively with the 
other statements within the attitude group. A high positive mean score 
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Figure 5. Attitude groups with significantly different mean scores 
by utility groups ' 
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therefore would indicate that a utility group held opinions along the 
highly favorable portion of the attitude continuum. A moderately positive 
mean score would indicate opinions along the moderately favorable portion 
of the attitude continuum. A low positive mean score would indicate 
opinions in the favorable portion of the attitude continuum but lying 
close to its center position or uncertainty. A zero score would 
indicate uncertainty and a negative mean score would indicate opinions 
along the unfavorable portion of the attitude continuum. 
Table 4 provides a guide for interpreting the relative location of a 
utility group along the attitude continuum for each of the attitude groups 
based on the attitude group mean scores. A utility group's position along 
the attitude continuum provides a relative indication of the opinions 
held by that group. 
All reference to attitude group scores or statement scores refers to 
the mean score for all respondents in a utility group. 
Attitude group A 
Attitude group A consisted of 4 statements with high intercorrelation 
each of which expressed an opinion about attitude variable I: To what 
degree does regulation currently influence managerial performance? 
A comparison of attitude group A scores by utility groups is shown 
in Figures 7 and 8. 
Utility groups 1, 2, 3, and 4 did not differ significantly in their 
scores on this attitude group. 
Utility group 8-9 however did differ significantly with utility 
group 1, utility group 1-7, and utility group 2-3-4 in their score on 
I 
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Table 4. Attitude scores indicating various positions along an attitude 
continuum 
Average unscored response 
Number of 60-70 75-85 90-99 
Attitude statements 
group in Position along favorable portion 
attitude attitude continuum 
group Low Moderate High 
A 4 1.0- 2.1 2.7- 4.1 5.1- 9.3 
B 4 1.0- 2.1 2.7- 4.1 5.1- 9.3 
C 4 1.0- 2.1 2.7- 4:1 5.1- 9.3 
D 8 2.0- 4.2 5.4- 8.3 10.3-18.6 
E 6 1.5- 3.1 4.0- 6.2 7.7-14.0 
F 4 1.0- 2.1 2.7- 4.1 5.1- 9.3 
G 15 3.8- 7.9 10.0-15.6 19.2-34.9 
attitude group A. 
With Table 4 as a guide, it is noted that commission personnel, as a 
group, scored in the moderate to highly favorable portion of the attitude 
continuum. This expresses opinions which are moderate to highly favorable 
toward current regulation and its influence on managerial performance. 
Utility managers, utility groups 1, 2-3-4, or 1-7 expressed only 
moderately favorable opinions regarding the current influence of regula­
tion on managerial performance. 
Attitude group B 
Attitude group B consisted of 4 statements with high intercorrelation 
each expressing an opinion about attitude variable II: To what degree is 
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it possible to measure managerial performance? 
A comparison of attitude group B scores by utility groups is shown 
in Figures 9 and 10. 
Utility groups 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7 did not differ significantly 
between themselves in their scores for this attitude group. Utility 
group 1, utility group 2-3-4, and utility group 1-7 however each differed 
significantly with utility group 8-9 when attitude group scores were 
compared. 
This indicates a basic agreement among utility managers regarding the 
possibility of measuring managerial performance. Their scores on this 
attitude group were in the moderate to highly favorable portion of the 
attitude continuum. This is indicative of quite positive opinions that 
managerial performance can be measured. 
Commission personnel scored significantly lower along the attitude 
continuum indicating low opinions regarding the possibility of measuring 
managerial performance. 
Attitude group C 
Attitude group C consisted of 4 statements with high intercorrela-
tion each expressing an opinion about attitude variable III: To what 
degree is research and investigation needed on a method or methods for 
providing incentive to utilities through regulation? 
A comparison of attitude group C scores by utility groups is shown 
in Figures 11 and 12. 
Utility group 1 and utility group 2 had significantly different mean 
scores on this attitude group. The telephone managers scored high. 
72 
5.0-
4.0-
<u 
M 
0 
U 
CO 
O. 
g 3.0-
& 
(U 
1 
•rl U  
a  
< 2.0-4 
1.0-
2-3-4 1-7 
Utility groups 
8-9 
Figure 9. Attitude group B score by utility groups 
73 
5.0-
<u 
ë 
0 
OD 
g 
0) 
1 
•rl 
4J 
4.0 -• 
3.0 
2.0-
1.0* 
3 4 7 
Utility groups 
Figure 10. Attitude group B score by utility groups 
74 
6 . 0 -
5.0-
« 
k 
0 
u 
CO 
1 
& 
(U 
I 
•I-< 
4J 
4-> 
4.0-
3.0-
2.0-
1.0-
2-3-4 1-7 
Utility group 
8-9 
Figure 11. Attitude group C score by utility groups 
75 
7.0-
6 .0— 
5.0-
4.0" 
3.0-
2.0-
1.0-
3 4 7 
Utility groups 
Figure 12. Attitude group C score by utility groups 
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indicating highly positive opinions that research is needed. Gas utili­
ties indicated only moderately positive^ opinions. 
Utility group 2-3-4 differed significantly with utility-group 1 in 
their response to this attitude group. This was influenced partially by 
utility group 2. 
Utility group 8-9 and utility group 2 had similar scores for this 
attitude group. Altho utility group 8-9 did not differ with utility 
group 2-3-4 in their response to this attitude group they did differ 
significantly with utility group 1. 
1 I 
This indicates less unanimity between the different utility groups 
concerning their opinions about the need for research in this area. The 
differences however are in degrees of positiveness, for each expressed 
positive opinion that a certain amount of research is necessary. 
Attitude group D 
Attitude group D consisted of 8 statements with high intercorrelation 
each expressing an opinion about attitude variable IV: To what degree 
should regulation attempt to motivate exceptional managerial performance? 
A comparison of attitude group D scores by utility groups is shown 
in Figures 13 and 14. 
Some lack of agreement is again noted between the different utility 
groups. Utility group 3 scored significantly different on this attitude 
group than did either utility group 1 or utility group 2. Utility group 
1 and utility group 8-9 also differed significantly in their scores on 
this attitude group. 
Each of the utility groups scored in the highly favorable portion of 
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the attitude continuum indicating strong opinions that regulation should 
attempt to motivate exceptional managerial performance. Even so, utility 
managers as a group, utility group 1-7, were significantly more positive 
in their opinions that regulation should attempt to motivate exceptional 
managerial performance than utility group 8-9. 
The telephone utility managers scored highest on this attitude group 
indicating they held the most positive opinions about the need for regula­
tion attempting to motivate exceptional managerial performance. 
Attitude aroup R 
Attitude group E consisted of 6 statements with high intercorrela-
tion each expressing opinions about attitude variable V: To what degree 
is the rate of return important as a motivator of exceptional managerial 
performance? 
A comparison of attitude group E scores by utility groups is shown 
in Figures 15 and 16. 
Utility group 3 and utility group 4 scored significantly different 
on this attitude group. This difference however seems relatively insig­
nificant when compared to the larger difference in scores between utility 
group 1 and utility group 8-9, and between utility group 2-3-4 and 
utility group 8-9. 
Managers of electric utilities scored in the highly favorable por­
tion of the attitude continuum expressing opinions that the rate of 
return was very important as a motivator of exceptional managerial 
performance. Utility managers as a group however, scored in the 
moderately favorable portion of the attitude continuum. 
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Figure 15. Attitude group E score by utility groups 
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Commission personnel scored in the very low favorable portion of the 
attitude continuum, approaching the center portion or uncertainty. This 
indicates considerable doubt among commission personnel regarding the 
importance of the rate of return as a motivator of managerial performance. 
Attitude group F 
Attitude group F consisted of 4 statements with high intercorrela-
tion each expressing an opinion about attitude variable VI: To what 
degree is profit an indicator of exceptional managerial performance. 
A comparison of attitude group F scores by utility groups is shown 
in Figures 17 and 18. 
There was no significant difference in the mean scores for this 
attitude group between utility groups 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7. A significant 
difference in mean scores did occur when utility group 8-9 was compared 
with utility group 1, utility group 2-3-4, and utility group 1-7. 
Utility managers scored along the low favorable portion of the 
attitude continuum. This indicates opinions which hold a very low posi­
tive regard for profit as an indicator of exceptional managerial 
performance. 
Commission personnel scored in the negative portion of the attitude 
continuum. This score indicates a low degree of disagreement with 
opinions expressing profit as an indicator of exceptional managerial 
performance. 
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Attitude group G 
Attitude group G consisted of 15 statements with relatively high 
intercorrelation each expressing opinions about attitude variable VII: 
To what degree is the quality of a utility's interpersonal activities an 
indicator of exceptional managerial performance? 
A comparison of attitude group G scores by utility groups is shown 
in Figures 19 and 20. 
There was no significant differences in the scores for this attitude 
group between the different utility groups. Each utility group scored in 
the moderately favorable portion of the attitude continuum. This only 
indicates moderate acceptance of the group of statements as a whole. 
Further analysis of the statements within this attitude group G was 
performed by grouping those statements which had reference to customers 
into one group and those statements which had reference to employees into 
a second group. 
Statements 51, 54, 55, 65, 66, and 67 were indices of managerial 
performance which related to personnel activities. This group of state­
ments was scored in the same manner as an attitude group. The scores by 
utility group are summarized in Figure 21. It was noted that while all 
utility groups held a moderate regard for the importance of indices which 
relate to the employee, the gas and electric utility groups as well as the 
commissioners held the highest regard for these indices. Commission per­
sonnel held these indices in lowest regard. 
Statements 45, 46, 60, 63, and 64 were indices of managerial perform­
ance which related to customer activities. This group of statements was 
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also scored in the same manner as an attitude group. A comparison of the 
[ 
scores by utility groups is shown in Figure 22. These indices are also 
held in moderate regard by each utility group, but telephone managers and 
commissioners scored them the highest. 
Results of Analysis of Individual Statement Scores 
Further analysis of the data obtained from the attitude survey 
questionnaire was made by comparing the mean scores for each statement 
between utility groups, and by identifying those statements and utility 
groups with significantly different mean scores. The results of these 
comparisons are shown in Figures 23 through 37. Each point represents 
the mean score on a statement for the appropriate utility group. State­
ments with significantly different mean scores are circled and identified 
by the statement number. 
The comparison of mean scores by statement between utility group 7 
and utility groups 1, 2, 3, and 4 is shown in Figures 23, 24, 25, and 26. 
Due to the small number of respondents in utility group 7, a large 
difference in mean scores was necessary before the "student's" t-test 
indicated the difference was significant. Utility group 7 did not give 
indications of being basically different from utility groups 1, 2, 3, or 4. 
The comparison of mean scores for each statement between utility 
group 8 and utility group 9 is shown in Figure 27. It was found that 
these two utility groups responded very much the same to each statement. 
Those statements with significantly different mean scores were statements 
concerning the indices of exceptional managerial performance. 
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Figure 23. Mean scores by statement for utility group 1 vs utility 
group 7 
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Figure 24. Mean scores by statement for utility group 2 vs utility 
group 7 
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Figure 25. Mean scores by statement for utility group 3 vs utility 
group 7 
94 
+2.0 
Zo 
+1.0 
Zb 
•H 
'  -1 .0 
-2.0 -1.0 0 +1.0 +2.0 
Utility group 4 
Figure 26. Mean scores by statement for utility group 4 vs utility 
group 7 
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Figure 27. Mean scores by statement for utility group 8 vs utility 
group 9 
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Figure 28. Mean scores by statement for utility group 1 vs utility 
group 2 
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Figure 29. Mean scores by statement for utility group 1 vs utility 
group 3 
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Figure 30. Mean scores by statement for utility group 1 vs utility 
group 4 
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Figure 31. Mean scores by statement for utility group 2 vs utility 
group 3 
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Figure 32. Mean scores by statement for utility group 2 vs utility 
group 4 
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Figure 33. Mean scores by statement for utility group 3 vs utility 
group 4 
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Figure 34. Mean scores by statement for utility group 1 vs utility 
group 2-3-4 
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104 
+2.0 
3o 
+1.0 
66 
o\ 0 so 00 
© 33 3A 
•H 
'H 
-1.0 
-2.0 
-2.0 I -1.0 0 +1.0 +2.0 
Utility group 2-3-4 
Figure 36. Mean scores by statement for utility group 2-3-4 vs utility 
group 8-9 
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The comparison of mean scores for each statement between utility 
groups 1, 2, 3, and 4 is shown in Figures 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, and 33. 
These comparisons indicate that utility groups 1, 2, 3, and 4 have rela­
tively few statements with scores which are significantly different. 
This is an additional indication that these utility groups are in basic 
agreement concerning their reaction to opinions expressed by the state­
ments on the attitude survey questionnaire. This is further substantiated 
by a comparison of mean scores for each statement between utility group 1 
and utility group 2-3-4 as shown in Figure 34. 
The comparison of mean scores for each statement between utility 
group 8-9 and utility groups 1, 2-3-4, and 1-7 is shown in Figures 35, 
36, and 37. The relatively large number of statements showing significant 
differences in mean scores indicates the difference in opinions held by 
utility managers and commission personnel. 
Analysis of an attitude group precluded the necessity of analyzing 
individual statements comprising the attitude groups. Those statements 
which were not a part of any attitude group were divided into two groups 
for further analysis. 
Group 1 consisted of statements with significantly different mean 
scores between utility group 1-7 and utility group 8-9. Group 2 consisted 
of statements with no significant difference in mean scores between utility 
group 1-7 and utility group 8-9. 
Analysis of statements with significantly different mean scores 
Table 5 lists the statements in group 1 and the mean score for each 
utility group. Table 6 lists the statements in group 2 and each utility 
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Table 5. Mean scores significantly different by statement for utility 
group 1-7 vs utility group 8-9 
Statement Utility group 
1-7 8-9 
2 +.54 -.36 
3 +.50 -.26 
6 -.99 +.12 
17 
CM 0
0 
-.24 
20 -.51 -1.19 
33 -1.03 -.12 
40 -.42 +.34 
44 
00 o
 
t +.29 
50 -.32 +.21 
groups's mean score. 
The replies to statements in group 1 were analyzed individually for 
any additional information relevant to this study. 
Statement 2 reads: I feel that current regulation fails to provide 
an incentive to management to improve performance but it 
doesn't stifle incentives either. 
Statement 5 reads: I think current regulation neither condones 
inefficiency or encourages improved managerial performance. 
Statement 6 reads; I feel management receives the maximum possible 
encouragement for exceptional performance under the present 
regulatory practices. 
Each group's responses to these statements seem only to substantiate 
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Table 6. Mean scores lacking significant differences by statement for 
utility group 1-7 vs utility group 8-9 
Statement Utility group 
1-7 8-9 
8 +.06 +.02 
9 , +.30 +.34 
12 +.48 +.69 
24 -.31 +.0 
27 -.61 -.96 
29 +.55 +.84 
35 +.60 +.67 
47 +.31 +.50 
52 +.71 +.87 
53 +.98 +.93 
56 -.66 -.42 
57 -.65 -. 66 
61 +.05 -.09 
62 -.10 -.18 
68 + .44 +.23 
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the findings from the analysis of attitude group A scores. Commissioners 
and commission personnel rate their current performance in influencing 
managerial performance significantly higher than do the utility managers. 
Statement 17 reads: I guess some research should be done in this 
area just as a matter of policy. 
This statement reflects a causal attitude toward possible research. 
Disagreement with this statement indicates a more positive opinion about 
the need for research. These scores thus indicate a moderate need for 
research and substantiate the findings from the analysis of attitude 
group B. 
Statement 20 reads: I don't believe that regulation should try to 
influence managerial performance. 
Commissioners and commission personnel by their strong disagreement 
with this statement indicate opinions that they should try to influence 
managerial performance. Utility managers also disagree with this state­
ment but not as strongly as utility group 8-9. This response may reflect 
uncertainty concerning what might be considered proper influence over 
managerial performance by the regulatory body. 
Statement 33 reads: The regulatory process would motivate excep­
tional managerial performance by recognizing managerial 
performance in a non-monetary manner only. 
Utility managers disagree moderately high with this statement 
indicating a possible failure in non-monetary methods of motivation. This 
also indicates a possible need for financial incentive to bring out the 
best in a management group. Utility group 8-9 expresses near uncertainty 
regarding this statement. 
Statement 40 reads: The regulatory body would motivate exceptional 
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managerial performance through the rate base and the allowed 
expenses by disallowing those expenditures resulting from poor 
and insufficient managerial performance. 
Utility managers reflect uncertain opinion about this statement. 
Commission personnel indicate only low agreement to the statement. This 
probably reflects the sensitivity of the subject matter, the rate base, 
and the indecision of both groups as to its proper use as a motivator of 
exceptional managerial performance. 
Statements 44 and 50 related to indices of exceptional managerial 
performance. Extensive analysis of these responses was not considered a 
part of the original study. 
Analysis of statements with no significant difference 
in mean scores 
There were 15 statements to which utility group 1-7 and utility 
group 8-9 responded without significant differences. Each statement was 
reviewed to see what additional information might be suggested by 
agreement between the two utility groups rather than disagreement. Only 
those statements which provided information relevant to this study are 
noted. 
Statement 9 reads: I think that the regulatory body has sufficient 
information to enable them to evaluate managerial performance. 
Both utility groups express low agreement with this statement. This 
would indicate that commissioners and their staffs would hesitate making 
such an evaluation and utility managers would not favor such an evaluation. 
Statement 27 reads: Regulation should only try to influence and 
improve managerial performance which is below average. 
The moderate disagreement with this statement indicates opinions 
Ill 
which hold that regulation is not relegated to trying to influence only 
those utilities with below average performance. 
Commission Recognition of Managerial Efficiency 
A number of questions were asked each respondent on the cover sheet 
of the attitude survey questionnaire. Only the result of the responses to 
question 5 is relevant to the primary purpose of this study. 
Question 5 reads: Does the commission recognize managerial 
efficiency when considering the adequacy of the return? 
The distribution of the responses by utility managers, utility group 
1-7, and commission personnel, utility group 8-9, is shown in Table 7. 
Table 7. Distribution of responses to question 5 on the attitude survey 
questionnaire by utility group 
Statement checked as reply 
Percent replying 
Utility 
managers 
Commission 
personnel 
1. No reply given 14.5 
2. No, the commission does not recognize 
managerial efficiency 33.0 
3. Yes, and they allow an increased rate of 
return for efficient management 6.0 
4. Yes, and they penalize inefficient management 
with a reduced rate of return 1.7 
5. Yes, but it does not influence the rate 
of return 25.0 
6. Yes, and they may refuse a rate increase 
for inefficient management 8.5 
7. Yes, and they reward management in some manner 
other than by an increased rate of return 2.5 
8. Other than above 9.3 
11.8 
19.6 
3.9 
3.9 
33.3 
5.9 
11.8 
9.8 
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Better than 50% of all respondents felt the commission either did 
not recognize managerial efficiency, or, if they did, they did not let it 
influence the allowed rate of return. Only 6% of the utility managers 
and 3.9% of the commission personnel felt an increased rate of return was 
allowed for efficient management. 
The above findings and results were weighed by the investigator in 
reaching conclusions based on this study. A discussion of the results 
and conclusions are presented in the final section. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This discussion considers the findings of this research study as 
viewed by the investigator. Consideration is given to the relative low 
return of completed survey questionnaires; to the acceptance or rejection 
of the primary and secondary hypotheses and their implications; and to 
the information provided regarding the three questions presented in the 
introduction. Following a review of the basic conclusions reached in this 
study, a brief discussion identifies the subject matter requiring future 
research. 
I Low Returns 
A high return is always desirable when sampling is used to survey a 
population, but there may also be significance in the possible reasons 
for a low return. Responses to the initial letter introducing this 
research topic, as well as subsequent letters, gave indications of 
interest and a desire to be of assistance. The low return of completed 
survey questionnaires may have been due to a number of reasons. 
First: This study and the initial mailing of the questionnaire was 
made during the summer months. It is possible that vacations caused some 
individuals to delay, and to later decide against completing the attitude 
survey questionnaire. 
Second: Certain states are still without state regulation over 
electric, gas or telephone utilities. The commission personnel and the 
utility managers in these states may have felt their reply was unimportant. 
Third; The survey questionnaire may have created confusion for some 
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individuals resulting in their failing to reply. The review of literature 
did not reveal any attitude study within the electric, gas, or telephone 
industries, or within state commissions which utilized research methods 
similar to those used in this study. A few of the respondents expressed 
difficulties in replying to the questionnaire. This seems to indicate 
that some individuals may have found confusing the form of the survey 
questionnaire and the nature of the response required. 
A respondent's confusion may have been due to his failure to read the 
instructions and directions carefully, or due to difficulties in communi­
cating directions and instructions by letter. 
Fourth: A failure to reply may also have been due to the individual's 
lack of interest in the subject matter under study and/or his unwillingness 
to assist in such a study. Utility managers and commissioner personnel 
are probably subjected to numerous surveys and requests for information. 
One more request may not have received very close attention and may also 
have been discarded unread. 
Population sampled 
Although any one of the above reasons may explain the relatively low 
return experienced in this survey, it is believed that only the last pos­
sibility might influence the conclusions reached from this study. 
The population to be sampled was originally intended to be all 
electric, gas, and telephone utility managers and commissioners and 
commission personnel.-" It may be that a sub-population was actually 
sampled which included those individuals which held some interest in this 
study or at least a willingness to be of some assistance. 
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It has been concluded that those who replied initially and those who 
I 
replied after receiving the follow-up letter were not a significantly dif­
ferent population. The subpopulation actually sampled did not change in 
composition after mailing the follow-up letter. This adds validity to 
the findings and results for it implies that further returns would not 
necessarily differ with the returns actually actually received. This 
also substantiates the belief that individuals who failed to reply for 
one of the first three reasons cited above would not necessarily be 
different from the actual respondents. 
It is.possible, however, that a failure to reply because of the 
fourth reason may indicate a second subpopulation. This second subpopula­
tion might be identified as utility managers and commission personnel 
who seem to have no interest in research concerning regulation's effect 
upon managerial performance, or at least they have no interest in assist­
ing with such research. The ideas and opinions held by this second 
subpopulation may differ with the ideas and opinions held and expressed 
by the individuals responding to the attitude survey questionnaire. 
A lack of interest in this subject area may be symptomatic of an 
inefficiently managed utility or a regulatory body which may be failing in 
one of its regulatory duties. This is speculation concerning an unknown 
group, but indicates that further research and study is needed into the 
attitudes and opinions of this hypothetical group as compared to the 
respondents to this study. 
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Primary Hypotheses 
The conclusions reached from this study can be attributed only to 
the group actually sampled and are based upon the mean scores of 
respondents. This study was primarily interested in testing three 
hypotheses offered at the close of the introduction. 
Hypothesis I 
Hypothesis I: Utility managers and commission personnel, as groups, 
have the opinion that regulation currently assures 
only average performance and to a degree penalizes 
efficient management. 
To test this hypothesis, attitude group A was selected as a measure 
of attitude variable I: To what degree does regulation currently influ­
ence managerial performance? 
Based on this study, the above hypothesis is rejected. This study 
indicated that utility managers and commission personnel both hold opin­
ions that regulation encourages above average performance. Commission 
personnel feel their current influence is moderate to highly positive in 
encouraging exceptional managerial performance. Utility managers 
recognize a positive influence, but seem to hold opinions that this 
influence is only low to moderately positive. 
Both groups indicate by their responses to statement 6 on the 
attitude survey questionnaire that regulation is not providing the maximum 
possible encouragement to management. 
This difference in opinions held by utility managers and commission 
personnel is understandable. The commission personnel naturally would 
hold a higher opinion about the results of their efforts than would 
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utility managers. The fact that both groups recognize a difference be­
tween current influence and the maximum possible seems to be a realistic 
judgment on the part of both groups. It also is indicative of honest and 
sincere responses adding reliability to the findings. 
These findings refute arguments that regulation encourages ineffi­
ciency on the part of utility managers. Certainly those responding to 
this survey did not, as a group, feel this was true. ' 
Hypothesis II 
Hypothesis II: Utility managers and commission personnel, as groups, 
hold the opinion that it is possible to obtain a 
measure of managerial performance. 
To test this hypothesis, attitude group B was selected as a measure 
of attitude variable II: To what degree is it possible to measure 
managerial performance? 
Based on the responses received in this study, this hypothesis is 
accepted. 
Research on methods for motivating management will need to consider 
the possibility of differentiating various degrees of managerial perform­
ance. 
Utility managers have long been concerned with methods of measuring 
and evaluating past performance. They have at their disposal considerable 
cost data for use in measuring their performance, but they currently lack 
important noncost data which may also be necessary. 
This concern for managerial performance seems to explain their 
moderate to high opinions regarding the possibility of measuring 
managerial performance. 
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Both utility managers and commission personnel acknowledge that the 
commissions now lack sufficient information to enable them to evaluate 
managerial performance. 
The type of reports currently required by commissions probably do 
not contain the information necessary for a decision regarding a manage­
ment's relative performance. It, therefore, does not seem unusual for 
commission personnel to hold low opinions regarding the possibility of 
measuring managerial performance. 
At this time, it is also speculative regarding what information is 
necessary for effective measurement of managerial performance. It is 
quite probable that the utilities themselves do not currently have 
available information which may be considered important. This is 
particularly true concerning noncost data. 
Hypothesis III 
' Hypothesis III: Utility managers and commission personnel, as 
groups, have the opinion that research is needed on 
a method or methods for motivating management. 
To test this hypothesis, attitude group G was selected as a measure 
of attitude variable III: To what degree is research needed on a method 
or methods for providing incentives to utilities through regulation? 
Based on the responses received in this study this hypothesis is 
accepted. 
Utility managers indicated a high degree of need for research while 
commission personnel indicated a moderate degree of need. These opinions 
seem related to the opinions indicated by statement 6, which recognized 
the possibility for greater regulatory influence over managerial perform­
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ance. Having recognized this possibility for greater influence, they 
also recognize the need for research on methods providing for this 
influence. 
The responses by utility managers concerning research may have been 
influenced by their desire for individual company recognition based on 
their managerial performance. Utility managers would not feel the need 
for research unless they felt there was a possibility of receiving some 
reward for exceptional managerial performance. 
Hypothesis IV 
A hypothesis of secondary importance deserves a brief comment at 
this time. 
Hypothesis IV: Telephone managers, as a group, have opinions which 
differ from those held by gas and electric utility 
managers. These opinions express a more positive 
agreement with hypotheses I, II, and III. 
Based on the analysis of attitude group A, B, and C, this hypothesis 
is rejected. As a group, telephone managers respond significantly differ­
ently only with respect to attitude group C. Telephone managers expressed 
highly positive opinions regarding the possibility of measuring managerial 
performance. These opinions were significantly more positive than those 
expressed by the gas and electric utility managers. 
Training and measurement are related. Effective training programs 
require some means of measuring results. As a group, the telephone 
industry probably places more emphasis on managerial training and, there­
fore, has more confidence in its ability to measure managerial performance. 
This is speculative and requires confirmation through additional analysis. 
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The telephone utilities place considerable emphasis on performance 
and progress as evidenced by the publication, "Profit, Performance and 
Progress" (2). This emphasis would give them additional confidence in 
their ability to measure performance. 
Related Questions 
This study also sought information about attitudes and opinions 
relating to three questions presented at the close of the introduction. 
Each of the questions is discussed individually. 
Question 1 
Question 1: What effect should regulation have on managerial 
performance? 
Attitude group D was selected as a measure of attitude variable IV: 
To what degree should regulation attempt to motivate exceptional manage­
rial performance? i 
Both utility managers and commission personnel were in basic high 
positive agreement with opinions that regulation should attempt to 
motivate exceptional managerial performance. Utility managers, however, 
had higher positive opinions than commission personnel. 
; It must be recognized that no indication was given concerning how 
such motivation should be given. Utility managers would in all probabili­
ty accept only motivation which maintained a "hands off" approach by the 
regulatory body, leaving management free to operate as they choose. 
Commissions, on the other hand, might feel that extensive control over 
managerial actions would be the proper means of providing motivation for 
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exceptional performance. 
Both groups recognized the power of public opinion in motivating 
better management, but, as was recognized earlier, any method of 
motivation would in all probability have to include a financial incentive. 
Question 2 
Question 2: I-Jhat action by regulatory bodies would motivate 
exceptional managerial performance? 
Attitude group R was selected as a measure of attitude variable V; 
To what degree is the rate of return important as a motivator of excep­
tional managerial performance? The attitude group originally selected as 
a measure of opinions about this question included statements about non-
financial motivators and the rate base as a motivator, as well as 
statements about the rate of return as a motivator. Only those statements 
relating to the rate of return had relatively high intercorrelation and 
were, therefore, selected as a measurement of the importance of the rate 
of return as a motivator. 
Considerable disagreement is noted between utility managers and 
commission personnel with regard to this question. Utility managers hold 
a high regard for the influence of the rate of return as a motivator of 
exceptional managerial performance. This again seems to reflect opinions 
that proper motivation of exceptional managerial performance will come 
only from a prospective increase in the rate of return. 
Commission personnel, however, are uncertain in their opinions about 
the influence of the rate of return on managerial performance. This may 
be partially due to their lack of positive opinions concerning their 
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ability to measure managerial performance, and to the lack of a well 
defined plan for allowing an increased rate of return to those utilities 
which are exceptionally managed. 
The importance of the rate of return as a motivator differs among 
utility groups as shown in Figure 16. This indicates a relative disagree­
ment among utility managers about the true influence of the rate of return 
on managerial performance. 
Question 3 
Question 3: What performance is an index of exceptional managerial 
performance? 
Each of the original statements in this section of the attitude 
survey questionnaire reflected an indicator of exceptional managerial 
performance. Two groups of statements were found to have relatively high 
intercorrelation and each was identified as an attitude group. 
Attitude group F was selected as a measure of attitude variable VI: 
To what degree is profit a measure of exceptional managerial performance? 
Attitude group G was selected as a measure of attitude variable VII: 
To what degree is the quality of a utility's interpersonal activities an 
indicator of exceptional managerial performance? 
Utility managers may feel that the rate of return will motivate 
improved managerial performance, but they recognize it as only a weak 
measure of managerial performance. Commission personnel, however, do not 
recognize a positive correlation between profit and managerial performance. 
This conclusion is reinforced by the replies to question 5 on the 
cover sheet of the attitude survey questionnaire. 
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Better than 50% of all respondents felt the commissions failed to 
recognize managerial performance, or if they did, they did not do so 
through the rate of return. This being true, and considering that the 
regulatory process supposedly allows a utility a fair return on its 
investment, profit would not be related to the quality of a utility's 
management. 
Hypothesis V 
It is interesting to note that the statements in attitude group G 
related to a utility's interpersonal activities. A large proportion of the 
statements in attitude group G dealt with customer relations, customer 
services, personnel relations, and supervision. This attitude group 
therefore provided information regarding another hypothesis of secondary 
importance. 
Hypothesis V: Utility managers consider exceptional performance in 
areas related to personnel supervision as indicative 
of exceptional managerial performance. 
While these replies were not intended for extensive analysis at this 
time, they |did indicate the lack of agreement among utility groups upon 
one or a few strong indicators of managerial performance. They also 
provided insight into the opinions of both utility managers and commission 
personnel regarding the importance of the customer and the employee when 
determining the quality of a utility's management. 
This should not be unexpected, for it is only through cooperative 
group action that final results are achieved. The exceptionally managed 
utilities will achieve such a position only through cooperation and effi­
cient performance of every employee in the company. A utility is a 
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service industry, and its performance is, therefore, related to the 
customers' reactions on how satisfactory the service has been. 
It is interesting to note that the three statements in attitude 
group G which received the highest scores by utility managers were: 
Statement 66: A high quality of supervision indicates exceptional manage­
ment. 
Mean score for utility group 1-7 +1.27 
Statement 67: Highly dedicated employees indicate exceptional management. 
Mean score for utility group 1-7 +1.16 
Statement 46: Excellent customer relations indicate exceptional manage­
ment . 
Mean score for utility group 1-7 +1.06 
These responses lead to the acceptance oi hypothesis V. 
Commission personnel scored statement 46 and statement 53 highest 
with mean scores of +.93. 
Statement 53: Ready financing available at low interest rates indicates 
exceptional management. 
Commission personnel recognize the importance of the employee by 
scoring statement 55 second to the highest, with a mean score of +.89, 
Statement 55: High employee morale indicates exceptional management. 
Certainly continued research is needed on indices of exceptional 
managerial performance, but concentration in areas relating to the 
employee and the customer seems evident. 
Basic Conclusions 
The conclusions reached by this investigator based upon the analysis 
of responses to the attitude survey questionnaire can be summarized by 
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the following statements: 
1. Current regulation provides a positive influence upon 
managerial performance. 
2. The practice of regulation does not provide the maximum possible 
encouragement to management. 
3. Utility managers have moderate confidence in the possibility 
of measuring managerial performance but commission personnel 
express low confidence concerning this possibility. 
4. Research is needed on a method or methods for motivating 
management. 
5. Regulation should attempt to motivate exceptional managerial 
performance. 
6. Utility managers have a high regard for the rate of return as a 
motivator of exceptional management, but commission personnel are 
more uncertain regarding its importance. 
Considerations for the Future 
Considering the overall results of this study, what does it suggest 
for the future? 
While utility managers and commission personnel give indications of 
having different opinions, their differences are not as great as would be 
expected after a review of the literature. This should encourage and be 
a basis for improved cooperation in these areas of mutual interest. 
This study also highlights the need for continued research in a 
number of directions. 
First: The lack of a high response to the attitude survey question­
naire suggests research into the reason for a lack of interest, if such 
was the case, or the reasons for failure to cooperate in research which, 
from all previous indications, represented an area of intense interest 
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for utility managers and commission personnel. 
Second: This study found that the population responding to the 
attitude survey questionnaire felt research on a method or methods for 
motivating management was necessary. Research in this area must consider 
seriously a financial motivator, probably related to the rate of return. 
Use of such a plan will in all probability require a measure of managerial 
performance for proper implementation. 
Third: Extensive research is, therefore, needed into the different 
possible means for measuring, if only in a relative manner, the past 
performance of a utility's management. It must be possible to compare dif­
ferent managements and determine their relative proficiency. In this 
respect it may be necessary to develop a plan for management evaluation 
along lines similar to those of job evaluation. In order to make such an 
evaluation acceptable to both commission and utility managers, it may be 
necessary to have such an evaluation performed by a group of knowledge­
able individuals outside both the affected utility and the controlling 
commission. 
As research in these three areas progresses, the possible benefits 
from each proposed plan must be compared with the costs involved in 
implementing such a program. It may well be that our present system, 
while leaving room for improvement, is still the most efficient from a 
total cost viewpoint. 
The goal of such research must always be to provide improved utility 
regulation at relatively low costs while providing optimum benefits to 
investors, customers, employees, and managers. 
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IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY 
OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
Ames, Iowa 50010 
Department of Industrial Engineering April 27, 1964 
Dr. Harold Cowles recently requested your assistance in preparing an 
attitude survey. We appreciate your willing acceptance to help. 
i 
The measurement of an attitude, requires a standard of reference, or 
base, which can be used for comparative purposes. The material en­
closed with this letter, when completed according to the directions, 
will provide information which will enable us to determine the stan­
dard of reference to be used in measuring a particular attitude var­
iable . 
We are interested in the attitudes of regulators and management within 
three different areas. Three sets of statements are therefore enclosed 
so that we may determine a standard of reference for each attitude var­
iable. 
We would request your close attention to the directions, noting that you 
are not giving your own attitude on any statement, but only responding 
regarding the favorableness or unfavorableness of an attitude expressed 
by some stranger. 
Again, thank you for taking time from what I'm sure is a busy schedule 
to assist us in this program. Your earliest reply will be appreciated. 
Yours very truly. 
Clifford E. Smith 
Instructor 
CES:enr 
Enclosures 
Directions: 140 
Following these directions are statements about current regulatory practice and 
its effect upon managerial perfonsance. We are interested in your judgment con­
cerning how favorable an attitude is expressed by each statement. A good way to 
keep these directions in mind is to imagine you overheard a stranger making each 
of these statements. Then on the basis of the statement the stranger made, you 
are to indicate how certain you are that the stranger has a favorable attitude 
toward current regulatory practice and its effect upon managerial performance. 
If you can be sure the stranger does not have a favorable attitude by the state­
ment he mad^ indicate this by marking "1" next to the statement. This response, 
"1", indicates the chances are 1 in one hundred that thé stranger has a favor­
able attitude toward current regulatory practice and its effect upon managerial 
performance. If you can be sure the stranger does have a favorable attitude 
the statement he made, indicate this by marking "99" next to the statement. This 
response, "99"j indicates the chances are 99 in one hundred that the stranger has 
a favorable attitude toward current regulatory practice and its effect jipon man­
agerial performance. Use numbers between 1 and 99 to indicate intermediate de­
grees of certainty and if you feel the statement provides no information about 
the attitude of the stranger indicate this Iqr marking "50" next to the statement. 
1. I think regulation provides incentive to management to strive for __________ 
exceptional performance. 
2. I feel that regulation fails to provide incentive to management to 
strive for exceptional performance. __________ 
3. Regulation encourages inefficient and poor management performance. 
4. I believe that the normal "regulatory leg" provides management with 
sufficient incentive to improve their performance. __________ 
5. I think that regulation stifles managerial incentives for innovation 
ar.d greater efficiency. 
6. Ï doa't thiak regulation encourages efficient managerial performance. 
7- I feel tîiat current regulation fails to provide an incentive to man­
agement to improve performance but it doesn't stifle incentives 
either. 
8. I think regulation prevents inefficient management. 
9. I believe regulation prevents grossly inefficient management. 
10. Regulation only protects the public against the most obvious and 
easily identified managerial practices considered inefficient and 
poor management. 
11. I'm satisfied with current regulatory practices. 
12. I think current regulation obstructs effective managerial perfor­
mance. 
13i I feel that regulation at the present reduces the effectiveness of 
management. 
— 2 — 
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Lt. The current regulatory practice doss not prevent poor roaaagssuent. 
15. I don't believe that present regulation encourages inefficient man­
agerial performance. 
16. I feel that lAen management raises profit, it is offset by a regu­
latory act that reduces it, thus the noiWl incentive which moti­
vates business operations is impaired. 
17. I believe that current regulation is too restrictive of mamigement, 
and should be more lenient. 
18. I feel that current regulation provides the same incentives for 
exceptional performance to utilities as other firms have under 
non-regulated compstition. 
19. I think current regulation neither condones inefficiency or encour­
ages improved managerial performance. 
20. I believe motivation for exceptional performance must come from 
within the firm rather than from the regulatory body. 
21. I feel management receives the siaxiaum possible encouragement for 
exceptional performance under the present regulatory practices. 
22. Current regulation may give some incentive to management to perform 
above average, but not enough incentive to bring out the best manage 
ment perfcrjaance. 
23. I think current regulation encourages only average performance. 
24. Current regulation encourages above average performance. 
25 .  I  believe tlmt regulation has a responsibility toward the consumer 
to guard against inefficient performance. 
26. I don't feel that regulation is concerned with managerial perfor­
mance. 
27. I think regulation encourages exceptional managerial performance. 
28. I don't think regulation hinders performance improvement. 
29. Regulation does not protect poor performance. 
30. I believe tha.t regulation does penalize inefficient managerial 
performance. 
31. The regulators reward managerial effectiveness. 
32. The regulatory body is concerned with mora than just preventing 
gross inefficiencies of mamgement. 
33. I believe the regulatory body recognizes managerial effectiveness. 
- 3 -
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34. I don't think that regulators recognize managerial performance. 
35. I feel that the influence of regulatory bodies on managerial 
effectiveness is slight compared to other pressures on man­
agement for exceptional perfomanoe. 
36. I believe the regulation ccincers itself with only managerial 
performance \Aich is below average. 
37. I don't think that regulation restricts management in working for 
improved performance. 
33. I don't feel that regulation attemtps to influence managerial 
performance in any way. 
39. I think the regulatory body has more important responsibilities 
than trying to influence management performance. 
Directions : 143 
Following these directions are statemsnts about the possibility of measuring 
managerial performance. We are interested in your judgment concerning how fav­
orable an attitude is expressed each statement. A good way to keep these 
directions in mind is to imagine you overheard a stranger making each of these 
statements. Then on the basis of the statement the stranger made, you are to 
indicate how certain you are that the stranger has a favorable attitude to^/ard 
the possibility of measuring managerial perfonaance. If you can be sure the 
stranger does not have a favorable attitude by the statement he made, indicate 
this tgr marking "1" next to'the statemeat. This response, "1" iadicates the 
chances are 1 in one hundred that the stranger has a favorable attitude toward 
the possibility of measuring managerial performance. If you can be sure the 
stranger does have a favorable attitude by the statement he made, indicate this 
by marking "99" next to the statement. This response, "99" indicates the ol^ass 
are 99 in one hundred that the stranger lias a favorable attitude toward the poss­
ibility of iueasuring managerial performance. Use numbers between 1 and 99 to 
indicate intermediate degrees of certainty and if you feel the statement provides 
no information about the attitude of the stranger, indicate this by marking "50" 
next to the statement. 
1. It is impossible to measure managerial performance, _________ 
2. I believe that a measure of managerial performance can be obtained. ________ 
3. I feel that productivity, as measured by total unit cost per unit 
sold, is a good indicator of managerial performance. 
U. I tliink tîiat the Management Audit performed by the American Insti­
tute of Managers provides a good evaluation of management performance. 
5. I think that the regulatory body has sufficient information to enable 
it to evaluate managerial performance. 
6. I think that a group of business men and educators, representing 
different managerial areas, could provide an excellent evaluation 
of any company's management performance. 
7. I don't think management itself can accurately evaluate its own 
porfo rsuince. ________ 
8. I believe it is definitely possible to evaluate managerial perfor­
mance quits accurately. 
9. It may be possible to evaluate managerial performance in a very rough 
way. 
10. I'm sure it is possible to evaluate managerial performance. 
11. I think that the evaluation of managerial performance is te» subjec­
tive to be of any value. 
12. I don't believe there is any practical way of evaluating managerial 
performance. • 
13. I think degrees of management performance (good, poor, exceptional) 
are too ill-defined, making attempts at evaluation impractical. ________ 
Directions: 144 
Following these directions are statements about research on a method or methods 
for providing incentive to Utilities through regulation. We are interested in 
your judgment concerning how favorable an attitude is expressed by each state­
ment. A good to keep these directions in mind is to imagine you overheard 
a stranger making each of these statements. Then on the basis of the statsaent 
the stranger made, you are to indicate how certain you are that the stranger 
has a favorable attitude toward research on a method or methods for providing 
incentive to Utilities through regulation. If you can be sure the strange? 
does not have a favorable attitude by the statement he made, indicate this by 
marking "1** next to the statement. This rospoj^e, "1", indicates the chances 
are 1 in one hundred that the stranger has a favorable attitude toward research 
on a method or methods for providing incentive to Utilities through regulation. 
If you can be sure the stranger does have a favorable attitude the statsnent 
he made, indicate this marking "99" next to the statement. This response, 
"99", indicates the chances are 99 m one hundred that the stranger has a 
favorable attitude toward research on a method or methods for providing incen­
tive to Utilities through regulation. Use numbers between 1 and 99 to indicate 
intermediate degrees of certainty and if you feel the statement provides no 
information about the attitude of the stranger indicate this by marking "50" 
next to the statement. ' 
1. I feel research in this area is urgently needed. 
2. I believe that a certain amount of research in this area would be 
bénéficiai. 
3. I don't think vre should waste any time or money on research, la this 
area. ' 
4. I consider other problems in the utility - regulation relationship 
to be more important and in need of research. __________ 
5. I feel tlîat research is. important in this area ta.it certainly not 
urgent. . . 
6. I don't believe much could be gained by research in this area. 
7. I cm not interested in research in this area. 
8. I can't see where research is necessary in this area. ____________ 
9. I guess some research should be done in this area just as a matter 
of policy. • • 
10. We seed continued research in this area. 
11. I don't think research in this area will do any harm. 
12. Wa nest definitely need extensive research in this area. 
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I O W A  S T A T E  U N I V E R S I T Y  
of Science chnology 
A M E S ,  I O W A  5 0 0 1 0  
Engineering Extension, 110 Marsion Hall 
Area Code 515 231-
During this past year we have become interested in the question of managerial 
efficiency and performance and the effect, if any, which regulation has upon 
it. We feel that an important preliminary step to extensive research in this 
area is an opinion or attitude survey of the interested parties. 
To assist us in this preliminary step we invite you to participate in this 
initial research by completing an attitude survey questionnaire. 
To give you some idea of the form to be used we have enclosed a sample covering 
a hypothetical question. Please note that only your indication of agreement or 
disagreement with a specific statement is required. For this reason, we do not 
believe that completion of this survey will be particularly time consuming. 
We wouldl certainly appreciate your assistance in this research and hope that 
you will be able to participate personally. All the replies will be striictly 
confidential. All information will be used in a group basis with no reference 
to specific individuals. 
Sincerely, 
Clifford E. Smith 
Instructor 
!# 
O W A  S T A T E  U N I V E R S I T Y  
of Science chnology 
A M E S ,  I O W A  5 0 0 1 0  
Engineering Extension, 110 Marston /Va// 
Area Code 515 231-
During this past year we have become interested in the question of managerial 
efficiency and performance and the effect, if any, which regulation has upon 
it. We feel that an important preliminary step to extensive research in this 
area is an opinion or attitude survey of the interested parties. 
To assist us in this preliminary step we invite the commissioners, and possibly 
one or two of their staff, to participate in this initial research by completing 
an attitude survey questionnaire. 
To give you some idea of the form to be used we have enclosed a sample covering 
a hypothetical question. Please note.';that only your indication of agreement or 
disagreement with a specific statement is required. For this reason, we do not 
believe that completion of this survey will be particularly time consuming. 
We would certainly appreciate your assistance in this research and hope that 
you will be able to participate personally as well as a number of your colleagues 
and staff members. We would like to hear from you regarding the names and 
addresses of those persons to whom we may mail the subject survey questionnaire. 
All the replies will be strictly confidential. All information will be used on 
a group basis with no reference to specific individuals. 
Sincerely, 
Clifford E. Smith 
Instructor 
148 
Sample Survey Questionnaire 
Directions: 
Following these directions are statements about the effect of current regulation 
upon accounting methods. We are interested in your feelings or attitude about 
each statement. Some of these statements you will probably agree with, that is, 
some statements will express your own attitudes or feelings about the effect of 
current regulation upon accounting methods. Other statements will express 
attitudes or feelings opposite to yours. Still other statements you will be 
uncertain to some degree about how well it describes your feelings or attitudes. 
For each statement indicate how well it describes your attitude by a number from 
1 to 99. If you are certain the statement describes your attitude write "99" in 
the space provided after the statement. If you are certain the statement'describes 
'an attitude opposite to yours write "1" in the space provided. If you are very 
uncertain or can not decide if the statement describes your attitude write "50" 
in the space provided. Use numbers between 50 and .99 to indicate various degrees 
of agreement with a statement. Use numbers between 1 and 50 to indicate various 
degrees of disagreement with each statement. You may wish to refer to the 
following scale in order to keep these directions in mind, 
I I I I I I I I I I I 
I - 5Ô 99 
Disagree Uncertain .Agree 
1. Current regulation does not influence accounting practices. 
2, Regulation specifies an accounting method. 
3, Regulation gives a utility sufficient freedom in selecting 
their accounting methods. 
4. Regulation sees minimum standards regarding an accounting 
method. 
5. A well managed utility is not hampered by the current 
regulatory requirements on accounting procedure, 
6.. 
Continuation of similar questions, some you will agree with to a degree 
and others you will disagree with to a degree. 
149 
I 
APPENDIX C 
I 
î 
150 
I O W A  S T A T E  U N I V E R S I T Y  
of Science chnology 
A M E S ,  I O W A  5 0 0 1 0  
Engineering Extension, 110 Marsion Hall 
Area Code 515 231-
After receiving the first replies to our letter of May 12, we realized 
that we had failed to fully convey the information intended. 
As noted, we are interested in managerial efficiency in public utilities 
and the effect, if any, which state regulation has upon it. We have 
designed, and are having printed, a questionnaire which will measure 
the attitudes of regulators and public utility management on this sub­
ject. 
Enclosed with our first letter was a "sample" questionnaire to indicate 
the form which our survey quentionnaire would take and the nature of 
the response required. The attitude being measured and the statements 
used in this "sample" were selected for illustrative purposes only and 
will not be used in the actual survey. 
The survey questionnaire will be ready for mailing June 1 and will 
include a group of statements to which each participant will respond 
according to the degree of his agreement or disagreement with each 
statement, (See our "sample" Questionnaire) These statements have 
been carefully selected and tested to reflect the attitudes of reg­
ulators and public utility management. Our survey will include 
utility managers and commissioners from across the nation and will 
provide information about their attitudes regarding the effect of 
regulation on managerial efficiency. The survey will also indicate 
whether further research is needed in this area, if so, what direction 
such research should take. 
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We are asking you, as Chairman of the commission, to provide us with 
the names and addresses of those persons whom you believe will be 
willing to participate in this survey. We would like to have a 
number of participants from each state commission, preferably each 
of the commissioners and one or two of the staff. A return envelope 
is enclosed for your convenience. 
We regret any confusion which our first letter created and hope that 
we have clarified the situation. We would appreciate your early 
reply and will mail the survey questionnaire promptly to those you 
indicate. 
Thank you for your assistance and cooperation. 
Sincerely, 
C 
Instructor 
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echnology 
A M E S ,  I O W A  5 0 0 1 0  
Engineering Extension, 110 i^arston Hall 
Area Code 515 231- 3101 
June 12, 1964 
Dear Sir; 
We recently wrote to you and indicated our interest in the question of managerial 
efficiency and performance and the effect, if any, which state regulation has 
upon it. 
At that time we invited your participation in the initial research.' While no 
response to our original letter was requested, many of you have indicated 
considerable interest in this study and have willingly volunteered to assist us. 
We now enclose the Attitude Survey Questionnaire which we would like to have you 
complete on an individual basis. We encourage you to read the directions very 
carefully before proceeding with each group or statements. This will reduce 
the possibility of any misunderstanding and will increase the validity and value 
of the results. ' 
We certainly appreciate your assistance and assure you that all replies will be 
strictly confidential. We welcome any personal comments and any information 
which you care to submit in addition to the questionnaire. Please feel free to 
contact me if you have any questions. 
Sincerely 
Clixfrard E. Smith 
Instructor 
CES:jt 
Enclosure 
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I O W A  S T A T E  U N I V E R S I T Y  
of Science chnology 
A M E S ,  I O W A  5 0 0 1 0  
Engineering Extension, 110 iVIarston Haii 
Area Code 515 231- 3101 
June 12, 1964 
Dear Sir: 
We have initiated research here at Iowa State University into the question of 
managerial efficiency in public utilities and the effect, if any, which state 
regulation has upon it. 
We recently requested the chairman of each of the state commissions to submit 
names of those individuals who would be willing to participate in our pre­
liminary research by completing an attitude survey questionnaire. 
Your name was submitted and we now enclose the Attitude Survey Questionnaire 
which we would like you to complete on an individual basis. We encourage you 
to read the directions very carefully before proceeding with each group of 
statements. This will reduce the possibility of any misunderstanding and 
will increase the validity and value of the results. 
We certainly appreciate your assistance and assure you that all replies will 
be strictly confidential. We welcome any personal comments and any information 
which you care to submit in addition to the questionnaire. Please feel free to 
contact me if you have any questions. 
Sincerely, 
ZXi^îÂxà E. Smith 
Instructor 
CES:jt 
Enclosure 
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I O W A  S T A T E  U N I V E R S I T Y  
of Science chnology 
A M E S ,  I O W A  5 0 0 1 0  
Engineering Extension, 110 l\/Iarston Haii 
Area Code 515 231- 3101 
June 12, 1964 
The mailing of our "Attitude Survey Questionnaire" as described in our letter 
of Jung 4-is ,progr.esslh:g;ver^ satisfactorily. 
In hopes of expediting the distribution of this questionnaire, we are taking 
the liberty of sending you five copies with the ^ ope that you will distribute 
them to those persons who will be willing to participate. If additional 
copies are required, please let us know. 
A self-addressed stamped envelope is enclosed for each questionnaire. We hope 
that a number of your staff and fellow commissioners will be able to respond 
to this survey. 
Sincerely 
d E. Smith Clifg^
Instructor 
CES:jt 
Enclosure 
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ATTITUDE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
Name of Respondent: . (Optional) 
Title: . . (Optional) 
Company: (Optional) 
For classification and analysis purposes we would appreciate the following 
information: 
1, The majority of the electric, gas and telephone utilities are regulated by both 
a state and federal agency. While this survey is concerned only with attitudes 
about state regulation, please indicate by. whom you are regulated. 
a. Local regulation only 
b. State commission 
c. Federal commission 
2. Type of business and the method of financing. 
Holding Co. Telephone Investor owned_ 
Operating Co. Gas Other 
Distribution Co. Electric (Co-op, municipal, etc.) 
(Sell primarily to Regulatory Commissioner 
operating Co's.) Regulatory Staff member 
3. What method is used by the state regulatory body in determining the rate base? 
(Provide this information for the state in which you do the major portion of your 
business. If your business covers a number of states, you may elect to omit this 
question.) 
Original cost 
State Fair value 
Other (explain) 
4. Do you allow (as commissioners), or are you regulated under (as a utility), a plan 
which allows continuous control of earnings or a so called sliding scale arrangement? 
Continuous:Control of Earnings Sliding Scale Plan 
Continuous:Control of Earnings 
Yes 
No 
Sliding Scale Plan 
Yes 
No 
If yes, can you provide information on such a plan or plans? 
5. Does the commission recognize managerial efficiency when considering the adequacy 
of the return? Please check the appropriate statement (s). 
No, the commission does not recognize managerial efficiency, 
Yes, and they allow an increased rate of return for efficient management. 
Yes, and they penalize inefficient management with a reduced rate of return. 
Yes, but it does not influence the rate of return. 
Yes, and they may refuse a rate increase for inefficient management. 
Yes, and they reward management in some manner other than by an increased 
rate of return. 
Yes, (Other-please explain) 
6. What do you consider a fair rate of return for a utility with: 
a. Average managerial performance 
b. Exceptional managerial performance 
c. Poor managerial performance 
d. Cannot say 
ATTITUDE GROUP I 
CURRENT EFFECT OF REGULATORY PRACTICE 
Please read carefully before proceeding. 
Directions: 
Following these directions are a group of statements about current regulatory practice 
and its effect upon managerial performance. We are interested in your feelings or 
attitude about each statement. Some of these statements you will probably agree with. 
That is, some statements will express your own attitudes or feelings about current 
regulatory practice and its effect upon managerial performance. Other statements will 
express attitudes or feelings opposite to yours. Still other statements you will be 
uncertain to some degree about how well it describes your feelings or attitudes. 
For each statement indicate how well it describes your attitude by a number from 1 to 
99. If you are certain the statement describes your attitude write "99" in the space 
provided after the statement. If you are certain the statement describes an attitude 
opposite to yours write "1" in the space provided. If you are very uncertain or cannot 
decide if the statement describes your attitude write "50" in the space provided. Use 
numbers between 50 and 99 to indicate various degrees of agreement with a statement. 
Use numbers between 1 and 50 to indicate various degrees of disagreement with each 
statement. You may wish to refer to the following scale in order to keep these 
directions in mind; 
I l  •  •  I  I I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  1  1  1  1  1  1  Uu- J  
1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 
Disagree Uncertain Agree 
1. Regulation encourages inefficient and poor management performance. 
2. I feel that current regulation fails to provide an incentive to management 
to improve performance but it doesn't stifle incentives either. 
3. Regulation only protects the public against the most obvious and easily 
identified managerial practices considered inefficient and poor management. 
4. I don't believe nTP-Q^^nt* racnil ai'-i r%-n -î fi^-P-P-î ^ -Î ««« « -1 
—  — • M — v - i ^ i - i o  x v a c ^ c u  X l l C  J .  J .  X U  X t ^ l l L .  c l l l U  p U U J ^  i n â X 1 3 ^ 6 i n 6 I l C  •  
4. I don't believe that present regulation encourages inefficient managerial 
performance. 
5. I think current regulation neither condones inefficiency or encourages 
improved managerial performance, 
6. I feel management receives the maximum possible encouragement for exceptional 
performance under the present regulatory practices. 
7. I believe the regulatory body recognizes managerial effectiveness. 
\ 
ATTITUDE GROUP II 
MEASUREMENT OF MANAGERIAL PERFORMANCE 
Please read carefully before proceeding. 
Directions; 
Following these directions are statements about the possibility of measuring managerial 
performance. Some of these statements you will probably agree with., That is, some 
statements will express your own attitudes or feelings about the possibility of measuring 
managerial performance. Other statements will express attitudes or feelings opposite 
to yours. Still other statements you will be uncertain to some degree about how well 
. it describes your feelings or attitudes. 
For each statement indicate how well it describes your attitude by a number from 1 to 
99. If you are certain the statement describes your attitude write "99" in the space 
provided after the statement. If you are certain the statement describes an attitude 
opposite to yours write "1" in the space provided. If you are very uncertain or cannot 
decide if the statement describes your attitude write "50" in the space provided. Use 
numbers between 50 and 99 to indicate various degrees of agreement with a statement. 
Use numbers between 1 and 50 to indicate various degrees of disagreement with each 
statement. You may wish to refer to the following scale in order to keep these 
directions in mind. 
L u l l  I  1  L  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  I 1  I ' . '  I  I  
1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 
Disagree Uncertain Agree 
1. I think that the Management Audit performed by the American Institute of 
Managers provides a good evaluation of managerial performance. 
2. I think that the regulatory body has sufficient information to enable them 
to evaluate managerial performance. 
3. I don't think management itself can accuratelv evaluate their own nerfmrmanre 
LU evaluate managerial performance. 
3. I don't think management itself can accurately evaluate their own performance. 
4. I believe it is definitely possible to evaluate managerial performance quite 
accurately. 
5. It may be possible to evaluate managerial performance in a very rought way. 
6. I think that the evaluation of managerial performance is too subjective to 
be of any value. 
7. I don't believe there is any practical way of evaluating managerial 
performance. 
ATTITUDE GROUP III 
RESEARCH REQUIREMENTS 
Please read carefully before proceeding. 
Directions: 
Following these directions are statements about research on a method or methods for 
providing incentive to utilities through regulation. We are interested in your 
feelings or attitude about each statement. Some of these statements you will pro­
bably agree with. That is, some statements will express your own attitudes or 
feelings about research on a method or methods for providing incentive to utilities 
through regulation. Other statements will express attitudes or feelings opposite 
to yours. Still other statements you will be uncertain to some degree about how 
well it describes your feelings or attitudes. 
For each statement indicate how well it describes your attitude by a number from 1 
to 99. If you are certain the statement describes your attitude write "99" in the 
space provided after the statement. If you are certain the statement describes an 
attitude opposite to yours write "1" in the space provided. If you are very uncertain 
or cannot decide if the statement describes your attitude write "50" in the space 
provided. Use numbers between 50 and 99 to indicate various degrees of agreement 
with a statement. Use numbers between 1 and 50 to indicate various degrees of 
disagreement with each statement. You may wish to refer to the following scale 
in order to keep these directions in mind. 
1 1  I  I  I  I  '  I  I  I  ' I I I  I  I  1 — - J  !  1  1 I 1 1 I I I I 
1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 
Disagree Uncertain Agree 
1, I believe that a certain amount of research in this area would be beneficial, 
2, I don't think we should waste any time or money on research in this area. 
3, I guess some research should be done in this area just as a matter of policy. 
j. I guess some research should be done in this area just as a matter of policy, 
4. I don't think research in this area will do any harm. 
5, We most definitely need extensive research in this area. 
ATTITUDE GROUP IV 
THE EFFECT REGULATION SHOULD HAVE 
Please read carefully before proceeding. 
Directions: 
Following these directions are statements about regulation and the effect lAiich it 
should have upon managerial performance. We are interested in your feelings or 
attitude about each statement. Some of these statements you will probably agree 
with. That is, some statements will express your own attitudes or feelings about 
regulation and the effect which it should have on managerial performance. Other 
statements will express attitudes or feelings opposite to yours. Still other 
statements you will be uncertain to some degree about how well it describes your 
feelings or attitudes. 
For each statement indicate how well it describes your attitude by a number from 
1 to 99. If you are certain the statement describes your attitude, write "99" in 
the space provided after the statement. If you are certain the statement describes 
an attitude opposite to yours, write "1" in the space provided. If you are very 
uncertain or cannot decide if the statement describes your attitude write "50" in 
the space provided. Use numbers between 50 and 99 to indicate various degrees of 
agreement with a statement. Use numbers between 1 and 50 to indicate various 
degrees of disagreement with each statement. You may wish to refer to the following 
scale in order to keep these directions in mind. 
I I I t I I I 1 I J I 1 1 1 1 1 1 LujjJ 
1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 
Disagree Uncertain Agree 
1. I don't believe that regulation should try to influence managerial performance. 
2. I think regulation should encourage exceptional managerial performance. 
3. The regulatory process should penalize inefficient managerial performance. 
3. The regulatory process should penalize inefficient managerial performance. 
4. I believe the regulatory process should provide an incentive to management to 
encourage exceptional performance. 
5. The regulatory body's basic concern should be in preventing gross 
inefficiencies of management. 
6. I believe the regulatory body should recognize managerial performance in some 
manner. 
7. The regulabbry body should recognize that its influence upon managerial per­
formance will be negligible at best. 
8. Regulation should only try to influence and improve managerial performance 
which is below average. 
9. The regulatory process should not protect inefficient performance. 
10. Regulation should be a substitute for competition. 
11. The regulatory process should not remove the incentive for exceptional 
managerial performance. 
12. The regulatory process should not treat efficient management and inefficient 
managements alike as this tends to remove the incentive to be exceptional. 
ATTITUDE GROUP V 
REGULATORY ACTION & MOTIVATION 
Please read carefully before proceeding. 
Directions : 
Following these directions are statements about regulatory action intended as motivation 
to achieve exceptional managerial performance. Some of these statements you will 
probably agree with. That is, some statements will express your own attitudes or 
feelings about regulatory action intended as motivation to achieve exceptional mana­
gerial performance. Other statements will express attitudes or feelings opposite to 
yours. Still other statements you will be uncertain to some degree about how well it 
describes your feelings or attitudes. 
For each statement indicate how well it describes your attitude by a number from 1 to 
99. If you are certain the statement describes your attitude write "99" in the space 
provided after the statement. If you are certain the statement describes an attitude 
opposite to yours write "1" in the space provided. If you are very uncertain or cannot 
decide if the statement describes your attitude write "50" in the space provided. Use 
numbers between 50 and 99 to indicate various degrees of agreement with a statement. 
Use numbers between 1 and 50 to indicate various degrees of disagreement with each 
statement. You may wish to refer to the following scale in order to keep these directions 
1 1 
Il 1 1 1 1 1 !  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 
Disagree Uncertain Agree 
1. I believe that a differential rate of return which would reward exceptional 
managerial performance and penalize poor managerial performance would motivate 
exception performance. 
2. The regulatory process would motivate exceptional managerial performance by 
recognizing managerial performance in a non-monetary manner only, 
3. The possibility of an increased rate of return for exceptional managerial 
nerfnrmanre wniilrl evrenfinnal neTfnrmannA 
3. The possibility of an increased rate of return for exceptional managerial 
performance would motivate exceptional performance. 
4. I believe that public recognition of a Utility for exceptional managerial 
performance would motivate exceptional performance. 
5. The motivation for exceptional managerial performance would come from 
regulatory recognition of adequate wages and salaries rather than from an 
increased rate of return on invested capital. 
6. Penalizing poor performance by allowing a reduced rate of return would motivate 
exceptional managerial performance. 
7. I believe that the possibility of both an increased rate of return and a non­
monetary reward would motivate exceptional managerial performance. 
8. The regulatory body would motivate exceptional managerial performance by 
allowing the rate of return to fall within a "zone of reasonableness" with 
exceptional managerial performance allowed to earn a return in the upper 
range of the zone. 
9. The regulatory body would motivate exceptional managerial performance through 
the rate base and the allowed expenses by disallowing those expenditures 
resulting from poor and insufficient managerial performance. 
ATTITUDE GROUP VI 
INDUCTORS OF EXCEPTIONAL MANAGEMENT 
Please read carefully before proceeding. 
Directions: 
Following these directions are statements about criteria which indicate exceptional 
management. We are interested in your feelings or attitude about each statement. 
Some of these statements you will probably agree with. That is, some statements will 
express your own attitudes or feelings about criteria which indicate exceptional 
management. Other statements will express attitudes or feelings opposite to yours. 
Still other statements you will be uncertain to some degree about how well it describes 
your feelings or attitudes. 
For each statement indicate how well it describes your attitude by a number from 1 to 
99. If you are certain the statement describes your attitude write "99" in the space 
provided after the statement. If you are certain the statement describes an attitude 
opposite to yours write "1" in the space provided. If you are very uncertain or cannot 
decide if the statement describes your attitude write "50" in the space provided. Use 
numbers between 50 and 99 to indicate various degrees of agreement with a statement. 
Use numbers between 1 and 50 to indicate various degrees of disagreement with each 
statement. You may wish to refer to the following scale in order to keep these 
directions in mind. 
Il I 11 I _ L  j_i_ 
1 10 
Disagree 
20 30 40 50 
Uncertain 
60 70 80 90 99 
Agree 
1. High profit performance indicates exceptional management. 
2. Continued profit performance over the long term indicates exceptional 
management. 
3. Evidence of growth indicates exceptional management. 
* j_i V V ^  J-v>a ^ u X iiiaita^diicitu a 
4. Low consumer rates (tariffs) indicates exceptional management. 
5. Exceptional service to the consumer indicates exceptional management. 
6. Excellent customer relations indicate exceptional management. 
7. A management training program indicates exceptional management. 
8. The composition of the Board (age, qualifications, background of directors) 
is indicative of exceptional management. 
9. Extension research on new service and production methods is indicative of 
exceptional management 
10. Continued construction of new physical plant indicates exceptional management, 
11. Excellent employee relations Indicates exceptional management, 
12.. Low unit cost of production indicates exceptional management. 
13. Ready financing available at low interest rates indicates exceptional 
management. 
14. Low labor turnover indicates exceptional management, 
15. ' High employee morale indicates exceptional management. 
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A decentralized organization indicates exceptional management. 
A one-year or operation plan or budget indicates exceptional management. 
A five-year operating plan or budget indicates exceptional management. 
A high rate of return on invested capital indicates exceptional management. 
Very few customer complaints indicates exceptional management. 
An above average wage and salary program indicates exceptional management. 
An above average indirect compensation program indicates exceptional 
management. 
Increased services to consumers indicates exceptional management. ' 
A continual increase in the services or improvement in the services to the 
consumer indicates exceptional management. _ 
A low rate of absenteeism indicates exceptional management. 
A high quality of supervision indicates exceptional management. 
Highly.dedicated employees indicates exceptional management. 
A low frequency and severity rate indicates exceptional management. 
High physical productivity indicates exceptional management, 
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I O W A  S T A T E  U N I V E R S I T Y  
of Science chnology 
AMES, IOWA 
Engineering Extension, 110 Marston Hall 
Area Code 515 231-
July 8, 1964 
Dear Sir: 
We hope to soon begin the analysis of responses to the Attitude Survey 
Questionnaire which we mailed June 19. 
We are requesting those who have not yet completed and returned this 
Questionnaire to do so within the next week if at all possible. I'm sure 
you have distributed the Questionnaires to those whose time is already 
in great demand, but we hope this study merits their time and consideration. 
Your cooperation in circulating this letter and its request for an early 
reply is very much appreciated. 
To those who have already responded, thank you. It is our intention to 
provide information concerning the results of this study to those Commissions 
who participate. 
CWyEord E. Smith 
Sincerely 
Instructor 
CESrdb 
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I O W A  S T A T E  U N I V E R S I T Y  
of Science chnology 
AMES, IOWA 
Engineering Extension, 110 Marston Hall 
Area Code 515 231-
July 8, 1964 
Dear Sir; 
We hope to soon begin the analysis of responses to the Attitude Survey 
Questionnaire which we mailed June 12. 
If you have not yet completed and returned this questionnaire, we would 
encourage you to do so within the next week if at all possible. I'm sure 
your schedule is already a full one and that your time is in great demand 
but we hope you feel this study merits your time and consideration. 
Your cooperation and early reply is much appreciated. 
If you have already responded, thank you. We plan to provide information 
concerning the results of this study to those of you who participate. 
Clif^^rd E. Smith 
Sincerely, 
Instructor 
CESrdb 
